

2021 ELECTION Observation Final Report

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*Fr. Emmanuel Chikoya,
CCMG Steering Committee Chair*

Executive Summary

Overview

As provided for in the Constitution, Zambia held general elections on August 12, 2021, which included presidential, national assembly, mayoral, and councillor races, five years after Zambia's highly contested 2016 general elections. Prior to the 12th August 2021 polls, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) conducted multiple electoral activities. These included boundary delimitation, voter registration, compilation and production of a new voter register, and conducting nominations of candidates. In addition, other stakeholders, including political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs) and faith-based organisations (FBOs), also conducted pre-election electoral activities. Prior to the registration of voters, mobile issuance of NRCs was conducted by the Department of Passports, National Registration and Citizenship (DPNRC).

Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG)

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG), as part of its mission to enhance the transparency, inclusivity and accountability of electoral processes in Zambia, conducted a comprehensive electoral process monitoring program for the 2021 electoral cycle. In addition to election day monitoring, CCMG observed the pre- and post-election periods, including boundary delimitation, national mobile issuance of NRCs, voter registration, long-term election observation, and a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). CCMG also monitored selected by-elections before and after the August 2021 elections. These activities, among others, helped CCMG to achieve its objectives- to strengthen democratic electoral processes and encourage citizen participation in democratic governance in Zambia through non-partisan election monitoring, research and documentation, electoral reforms advocacy and capacity building of civil society organisations in democracy, elections and governance. For the 2021 electoral cycle, CCMG recruited a total of 330 long-term observers (LTOs) who were responsible for reporting qualitative and quantitative analysis and contextual information about the pre- and post-election environment and 1,500 election day PVT monitors who were responsible for reporting both

qualitative and quantitative data through observation of polling stations set up and opening, voting, closing and counting procedures. CCMG's PVT monitors also reported on the results as posted at their assigned polling stations. The PVT methodology employed by CCMG involved the use of statistical principles and information technology, providing the most accurate and timely information on the quality of election day processes thereby enabling an independent verification of the official results based on observation of voting and counting at polling stations.

Key Electoral Processes in the 2021 Electoral Cycle and CCMG Key Findings

- i) *Boundary Delimitation:* CCMG observed the boundary delimitation sittings in mid-2019 and also conducted analysis of the 2016 and the 2021 number of registered voters within each constituency, and the relative voting power resulting from the delimitation. The guiding principles of the delimitation of boundaries should be not only the participation and inclusion of citizens but also maintaining the principle of equal suffrage or equality of the vote. However, for both the 2016 and 2021 electoral boundaries, CCMG's analysis found significant variation, with Lufubu (Central Province) with 11,411 registered voters and Kanyama (Lusaka Province) with 177,495 registered voters representing the two ends of the spectrum for the 2021 register, resulting in relative voting power of +395% in Lufubu and 25% in Kanyama.
- ii) *National Registration Card Issuance:* A national registration card (NRC) is the key document required for illegible voters to be allowed to register to vote and to present, along with a voter ID, on election day to be allowed to vote. While the issuance of NRCs takes place at district offices continuously, the mobile NRC issuance exercise, where teams under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) deploy

across the country to issue the cards, is a critical process for Zambians, particularly youth and first-time voters, to receive their NRC. The conduct of the mobile NRC issuance and its timing, while not administered by the ECZ, is nonetheless a key aspect of the electoral process. The mobile NRC exercise was conducted from August through November 2020 and MoHA exceeded its target for NRC issuance during the mobile exercise, with over 1.5 million Zambians able to obtain an NRC, many of whom were first-time voters. However, the process was affected by 58 unannounced mobile issuance exercises reported by CCMG's monitors prior to the official mobile exercise; lack of transparency on registration schedule and procedures; denial of access for CCMG monitors to NRC issuance centres; and unexplained large differences by province in issuance rates against MoHA official targets. For example, Luapula Province had a higher success rate against the MoHA target of 181%, while Western Province had a success rate of 52% against the target.

iii) Voter Registration: The ECZ conducted a nationwide voter registration from 9th November 2020 to 12th December 2020, followed by an extension from 17th to 20th December 2020. A total of 7,023,499 new voters were registered, 3,751,040 of whom were women and 3,372,459 of whom were men. Of these, 2,080,098 were aged between 24 years to 34 years representing 29.6% of the total number of registered voters and accounted for the largest demographic group, while 1,714,881 were aged 24 years and below representing 24.4% of the total number of registered voters. Although the ECZ did not provide disaggregated targets for voter registration of eligible voters or the voting age population, the voter registration exercise captured 83.2% of the estimated 8.4 million eligible voters at a national level.¹ After the registration of voters and the consolidation of the register, the ECZ conducted an online voter verification exercise from 7th February to 7th May 2021 and the physical inspection of the voter register which was conducted from 29th March to 7th April, 2021. CCMG deployed monitors for a sample-based observation of the voter registration exercise, conducted additional analysis of voter registration

figures, and regularly provided updates to stakeholders and the public on its findings. Despite requests, the ECZ did not share the voter registration procedures with stakeholders and the existence of multiple deployment schedules, one done by the ECZ's headquarters and others developed at the district-level, caused confusion in some areas.

Despite a registration rate that is comparable to other countries within the region, the voter registration process was not without concerns raised by multiple stakeholders, notably: the late announcement of the registration period; a shorter registration period than in the past; unreasonably long lines in some registration centres; significant disparities in registration centres staffing levels across provinces; lack of transparency about procedures, staffing and kit deployment, and; failure to provide CCMG monitors with detailed registration information. While the creation of a new register served to address the issue of the estimated 1.4 million deceased voters on the 2016 register, the ECZ's decision to create a new register was done without reasonable consultation with stakeholders on the merits and demerits of the development of a new register, and the introduction of new online pre-voter registration. CCMG's analysis of the 2021 register against the voting age population (VAP) noted five provinces where voter registration rates fell below the national average of 83.2%: Copperbelt at 81.4%, Lusaka at 80.3%, Muchinga at 79.1%, Southern at 77.4% and Central at 77.3%. Although the ECZ did extend the voter registration exercise, it did not re-deploy to those areas that may have been under-registered. Despite multiple requests, the ECZ did not allow CCMG to conduct an independent audit of the voters register, an exercise that would have provided valuable information about the accuracy and credibility of the register in light of these concerns to both the ECZ, other stakeholders and the general public. CCMG was also not permitted to conduct a field test audit of the voters register due to *Regulation 39 (1)* of the Electoral Process Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 80 of 2020. Despite conducting an ECZ-contracted internal audit in 2016, the ECZ did not conduct its own audit of the 2021 register.

¹ From the Zambia Statistics Agency (ZAMSTATS) on December 13, 2020 (<http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/its-8-4m-voters/>).

iii) *Campaign Period:* In the campaign period, incidents of politically-motivated violence became disturbingly common, with CCMG long-term observers (LTOs) reporting 76 incidents, the highest number (16 incidents) taking place in Lusaka Province. However, the suspension of in-person campaigns on 15 June appeared to have decreased these incidents. CCMG reports showed that UPND members/supporters were the main victims in politically-motivated violent acts in a ratio of 2 to 1 over PF, with these two parties responsible for the majority of the incidents. PF was identified the main participant/perpetrator in thirty-six (36) incidents against UPND's twenty (20) incidents, and an additional sixteen (16) incidents where both PF and UPND were involved and no clear perpetrator was identified. While the police did not make arrests in many of these incidents, CCMG noted that the police used excessive force on several occasions against UPND party members and supporters. Additionally, LTOs reported a total of 53 incidents of destruction/damaging of campaign materials or property with most of these perpetrated by PF party members or supporters and UPND was affected the most. On the eve of the election President Lungu deployed the military across the country, citing the need to control political violence. While the full impact of this action is unknown, at minimum, it had the potential to discourage citizens from exercising their democratic right to vote. CCMG LTOs reported 34 incidents that limited campaign space due to the Public Order Act or COVID-19 mitigation protocols, with almost all these limiting campaign space for UPND by the police. Despite the prohibition on collecting details in the NRC cards and/or voters cards, CCMG LTOs reported a total of 34 incidents where details or physical NRC and voters cards were collected with individuals associated with PF primarily, in a 6 to 1 ratio compared to UPND. In addition, CCMG LTOs reported 67 incidents where party supporters wore military-like attire, with these incidents involving PF at a 2 to 1 ratio compared to UPND. CCMG observers also reported 45 incidents of ferrying of youths from outside their constituencies for political reasons with most of these incidents happening in the Copperbelt Province.

Despite the Zambia Police's responsibility of maintaining peace, law and order during electoral activities CCMG LTOs reported low levels of provision of security during party events, a key measure in discouraging politically-motivated violence, with police providing security in 22% of PF activities, 16% of UPND and 13% for other parties/independent candidates. Furthermore, despite the suspension of the in-person campaigns, CCMG LTOs reported a total of 352 meetings conducted by PF with over 50 participants, and 174 such meetings conducted by UPND.

iv) *Accreditation:* On 12 July 2021, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) released new accreditation procedures for political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs), and the media. These guidelines were announced without any consultation with key stakeholders, and created significantly a more challenging accreditation process than had been implemented in the past, and established additional administrative burdens, contrary to best principles stated by the Election Commissions Forum of the SADC Region, of which the ECZ is a member. The guidelines established maximum numbers of observers per constituency and polling station for political parties and civil society organisations, limited the types of organisations that could observe, required multiple copies of certified documents, required all monitors to present themselves in person, and gave a short timeline for the accreditation process. The ECZ later extended the accreditation period from July 30th to August 2nd, but despite multiple stakeholders seeking clarification and revision of the guidelines, ECZ did not publicly provide any further guidance or revision to the procedures. This lack of clarity contributed to a lack of uniform application of the procedures across the districts, including the issuance of improper documentation to monitors. Despite concerns raised by CCMG on the accreditation process throughout the electoral cycle, and in the access of monitors to polling and registration centres and key information, the ECZ did not take on board recommendations to reform the process.

v) *Election Day:* On 12th August 2021, Zambians exercised their rights by casting their ballots across Zambia at 12,152 polling stations,

electing presidential, parliamentary, mayoral or council chairperson, and ward councillor candidates. CCMG deployed a total of 1,500 well trained and accredited non-partisan PVT observers to a national representative random sample of 1,500 polling stations. Four CCMG accredited monitors were initially not granted entry into polling stations, however after interventions all but one were ultimately allowed to observe.

Based on CCMG's PVT findings, polling stations opened on time with 96% opening by 06h30 across the country. On average polling stations had six polling officials, at least three of whom were women. PF and UPND had party agents at 99% of the polling stations at opening, and in 80% of the polling stations there was at least one agent representing other parties (not PF or UPND) or an independent candidate. In 99% of the polling stations, all strategic voting materials were present and the presidential ballot box was shown to be empty before being closed and sealed.

CCMG also found that voting procedures were followed in 99% of the polling stations. These included: voters' fingers checked for indelible ink; polling officials checked the voters' details in the voters register and the ballot papers stamped with the official stamp before being issued to voters. However, there were reports of some polling stations running out of ink that may have delayed the voting process. At 97% of polling stations, no one voted who appeared not to be eligible, while at 2% of polling stations, CCMG monitors reported a few individuals (1-5) were allowed to vote, even though they did not have both an NRC and voter ID card or had indelible ink on their fingers. Moreover, in 6% of the polling stations party agents could see how voters marked their ballots. Due primarily to long queues, CCMG found that 44% of polling stations closed at 18h00, with a further 47% closing by 20h00. Polling stations closed particularly late in Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces where 15% and 14%, respectively closed after 20:00hrs. PF agents were present for counting of ballot papers at 98% of polling stations while UPND agents were present in 99% of the polling stations. At 98% of

polling stations, ballot papers were shown to all party agents and monitors so that they could see how they were marked and at 99% of the polling stations PF and UPND party agents agreed with the presidential results.

On election day, there were numerous reports of internet access being limited. Global internet monitor NetBlocks confirmed that social media platforms and messaging apps were restricted on multiple internet providers, an act that undermined transparency of the elections and curtailed the right of voters to receive information about the elections. The matter was quickly challenged in court, and access was ultimately restored.

vi) Results Announcement and Post-Election: Following the announcement of presidential results by constituency, the ECZ declared Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND winner of the presidential election with 2,852,348 votes representing 59.0% of total valid votes on 16 August. He was followed by incumbent President Edgar Chagwa Lungu who received 1,870,780 valid votes representing 38.7% of valid votes cast. For the presidential race, a total of 4,959,332 votes were cast, with 4,832,763 valid votes, 126,569 rejected ballots, and turnout of 70.61% of registered voters². Following the official announcement of the results, CCMG released its PVT results estimates, which were consistent with the ECZ official results: the PVT estimated range for Hichilema's vote share was 57.7% to 60.5% and Lungu's PVT estimated range for his vote share was 37.1% to 39.7%. Based on the PVT estimates, CCMG noted that Zambians could have confidence that the ECZ's official presidential results were accurate and reflected the ballots they cast at polling stations. Soon after the official announcement, President Lungu conceded to the President-Elect Hakahinde Hichilema and his running mate, Mutale Namulango, were sworn in on 24th August 2021. However, prior to the declaration of the winner of the presidential election, the atmosphere was tense, particularly due to a statement by President Lungu that alleged that the elections were not "free and fair," and that the Patriotic Front's agents had been forced to leave

² These figures include the results for Mandevu Constituency which was not part of the initial set of constituency results announced by the ECZ. The ECZ originally declared the presidential election with 155 out of 156 constituencies announced.

polling stations in several provinces. Several stakeholders, including high-level representatives of international observer missions, diplomatic missions and CCMG's leadership, engaged in consultations to ease these tensions and avert an escalation.

vii) *COVID-19*: The COVID-19 pandemic presented a new challenge to the safety of voters and peaceful conduct of elections, and citizens' full participation in electoral processes during this electoral cycle. Throughout the pre-election period and on election day, multiple Statutory Instruments, Standard Operating Procedures and other guidance, including the use of alternatives to traditional rallies, were provided to mitigate the spread of the virus. However, CCMG's monitors noted that the adherence to these guidelines by political parties, ECZ staff and other stakeholders was inconsistent and the enforcement of the COVID-19 mitigation measures was frequently done by the police, without obvious involvement of health officials as required under the relevant statutory instrument. Police cited COVID-19 as the reason for shutting down 21 political party events, 18 of which were UPND activities. On the election day, at 95% of the polling stations, there was provision of hand washing or sanitising facilities while at 99% ECZ officials wore COVID-19 protective masks with social distancing only maintained in 87% of the polling stations. In 12% of the polling stations, a few potential voters (1 to 5) were not permitted to vote with COVID-19 mitigation measures cited.

viii) *Inclusion*: Despite some progressive measures towards greater inclusion, such as the provision for capturing voters' disability types at voter registration and the recruitment of people with disabilities (PWDs), women and youth as ECZ officials, greater commitment to the inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups in the electoral processes is needed. The ECZ did not meaningfully engage with civil society on accessibility issues for people with disabilities and did not provide its disability access plan for feedback. In addition, while voters were able to provide their disability information during registration,

these details were not systematically captured during the exercise and voters could only verify if their disability was captured by physically inspecting the register in the given period. Nearly half (48%) of polling stations required voters to climb stairs, and only 44% had Braille jackets to assist the visually impaired.

CCMG observers documented multiple instances of harassment of women, participating as candidates or voters in the electoral processes, as well as the use of gender stereotypes in campaigning. On election day, approximately half of all polling officials were women and 39% of security officers at polling stations were women, while 43% of PF and 37% of UPND party agents were women. At 96% of polling stations persons with disabilities, pregnant women, nursing mothers and the elderly were allowed to go to the front of the queue.

Recommendations

Based on CCMG's comprehensive observation of the 2021 electoral cycle, CCMG makes the following recommendations to stakeholders:

Electoral Commission of Zambia

• **ECZ Administration and Operations:**

Timely and Pro-Active Consultation with Civil Society; Appointment of a Liaison Officer:

Throughout the electoral cycle, and in contrast to past electoral cycles, the ECZ failed to systematically engage with civil society, refusing or ignoring reasonable requests for meetings or provision of key information. CCMG calls on the ECZ to take deliberate steps to improve its engagement with civil society, including the designation of a responsive and empowered CSO Liaison Officer who will serve as the contact person between the Commission and civil society actors to enhance engagement and two-way communication and information sharing.

- **Key Areas for Civil Society Consultation:** CCMG repeatedly called on the ECZ to engage stakeholders prior to and during boundary delimitation, voter registration, candidate nominations, the campaign period and election day. The ECZ failed to engage civil society on key decisions, including changes to the voter registration and the development of a new register, changes to the accreditation process, implementation of the Electoral Code of Conduct, and other key aspects of the 2021 electoral cycle. CCMG calls on the ECZ to hold regular consultations with civil society well in advance of all electoral processes or any changes to electoral processes prior to implementation to build broader based consensus and confidence.
- **Ensure Consistency of Application of Procedures and Deployment:** CCMG noted that district-level ECZ structures developed different deployment plans for voter registration from those published by the ECZ HQ, accreditation and monitor access to polling stations/voter registration centres was also not implemented in a standardized way and in some cases diverged from published procedures. CCMG calls on the ECZ to improve communication, accountability and harmonisation in the implementation of electoral procedures and deployments across its various structures, and to provide appropriate and responsive measures for redress.
- **Enhance Diversity of ECZ Staff:** While CCMG noted that approximately half of polling officials on election day were women, CCMG calls on the ECZ to take targeted action in to improve the diversity of its staff, including the inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups, such as youth and people with disabilities, and the inclusion of these groups and women in higher level positions.
- **Improve Accessibility of Electoral Processes:** CCMG calls on the ECZ to uphold the stipulations of the 2011 *Sela Brotherton v ECZ* judgement and improve the accessibility of venues used for electoral processes, including voter registration centres and polling stations. CCMG found that only 52% of polling stations were accessible to people with disabilities, and despite requests, the ECZ did not provide a detailed action plan for ensuring the accessibility of the 2021 electoral cycle. CCMG calls on the ECZ to engage with disabilities organisations and other stakeholders in addressing these issues and to publish a plan for improving accessibility for comment and consultant with PWDs well in advance of election day. CCMG calls on the ECZ to follow through on its commitment to have a dedicated staff person for improving accessibility of electoral processes for PWDs. In addition, given that government buildings, including schools, are frequently used as polling stations/registration centres, the improvement of their accessibility for PWDs is critical for PWDs to enjoy full rights to participate in educational and other activities.
- **Decrease Nominations Fees:** CCMG calls on the ECZ to revise its nominations fees for all candidates and with specific focus on fees for women, youth and PWD candidates, and to develop mechanisms for the reimbursement or refund of fees, including a refund in the event of a cancellation/postponement.

- **Timely Engagement with Stakeholders:** In addition to civil society, the ECZ should enhance its engagement and collaboration with all relevant stakeholders, including political parties, the police, the Zambia Statistics Agency (ZAMSTATS), traditional leaders, religious leaders, and civil servants.

Transparency and Accountability in Administering Elections:

- **Allow for Independent Voter Register Audit:** CCMG calls on the ECZ to allow for an independent audit of the current and future voter's registers to enhance the transparency of voter registration. The refusal to allow an independent audit of the 2021 register was a missed opportunity to build confidence in the register ahead of election day, address any errors or inconsistencies, and to build transparency in Zambia's electoral processes. Independent audits of voter registers are best practice both within Africa and globally and Zambia would benefit by allowing this because it will be consistent with the practice of other election management bodies. Furthermore, the voter register should be released to stakeholders as soon as feasible, with a timeframe established in the ECZ's administrative or legal framework.
- **Greater Transparency and Open Election Data:** Transparency is critical in building public confidence in the electoral process and providing open election data can enable citizens and stakeholders to foster this confidence. In addition to allowing an independent audit of the voter register, the ECZ should commit to the Open Election Data Initiative³. CCMG also calls on the ECZ to set clear timelines for providing information to stakeholders and the public, specifically:
 - **Electoral Process Procedures and ECZ Handbooks/Manuals:** all procedures for all electoral processes should be released in a timely manner to all stakeholders and the public, including boundary delimitation procedures, voter registration procedures, election day procedures, nominations procedures and accreditation procedures. Furthermore, stakeholders should be provided with an opportunity to review and provide comments and feedback on the procedures prior to finalisation.
 - **Legal Framework:** publicize and provide on the ECZ website all legislation related to the electoral process, including Statutory Instruments. Despite multiple requests, the ECZ has not updated its website to include Statutory Instruments and other electoral legislation enacted in 2020 and 2021.
 - **Release of Data to Observers/Monitors:** train electoral officials to provide information to observers/monitors, including voter registration data at registration centres and polling station identifying details. This type of data should be considered public information because it helps voters and stakeholders.
 - **Polling Station-level Results in Analysable Formats:** provide all polling station-level results in a format that is accessible and can be analysed, namely a .csv or excel file. The posting of results or release of results should include the full location information (province, district, constituency, ward and polling district as well as their respective codes) and with registered voters in addition to vote counts. Currently the ECZ's results posting practice continues to fall short of best practices for transparency and accountability as documented in the Open Election Data Initiative (<https://openelectiondata.net/>), which calls for all results to be available in a single downloadable file in a machine-readable format. Based on CCMG's analysis, results for the 2021 election for 545 polling stations were not included in the polling station-level results posted on the ECZ's website.
 - **Voter Registration Data:** publicise targets and schedules in a timely manner, as well as voter registration data by phase, beyond that published in 2021, particularly relating to key marginalised groups (youth and people with disabilities registrant data). Registration officers should be required to share the number of voters registered each day with observers and party agents, as well as the public, in the same manner as election results are done. This should not be treated as confidential information.

³ <https://openelectiondata.net>

- **De-duplication of Polling Station Names and Release of Polling Station List:** The ECZ must review and revise the current and any future list of polling stations so that no polling stations with duplicate names are used. There are 907 polling stations on the ECZ list of polling stations with identical names that are in the same constituency. This creates confusion for voters and stakeholders, and undermines transparency of results. Furthermore, the list of polling stations should be released to stakeholders and the public as soon as feasible, with a timeline established in the administrative or legal framework.
- **Staff and Resource Deployment:** We recommend that details for the deployment of staff and key equipment (voter registration kits, or other key materials and number of staff) for each electoral process, disaggregated to the constituency level be provided.
- **Ballot Paper Printing Monitoring:** The ECZ should establish clear rights and guidelines for the monitoring of the ballot paper printing by political parties and civil society stakeholders to enhance the transparency of the elections in the critical pre-election preparation stage. Efforts should be made to explore the possibility of printing ballot papers in Zambia. Time has come for Zambia to print its own ballot papers.

Electoral Code of Conduct Enforcement and Conflict Mitigation:

- ***Transparency of Proceedings of Conflict Management Structures:*** Enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct and sanctioning of parties or candidates is a matter of public interest. As such, the ECZ should publish a list of offences and associated sanctions, as well as timely reports of its proceedings in adjudicating on these issues at national, provincial and district level. These written records should provide the information or evidence considered as part of the deliberations and the reasons for the sanction, rather than a simple pronouncement of the sanction. In addition, all complaints should be made public to provide transparency for all stakeholders. Furthermore, CCMG calls for the constitution of the conflict management committees to be codified in order to ensure participation of all key stakeholders. In addition, the ECZ should review the procedures for bringing a complaint and ensure that any aggrieved person has adequate information and recourse to do so.
- ***Electoral Code of Conduct Enforcement and Transparency:*** Despite the enactment of SI 35 – Electoral Code of Conduct Enforcement, and the conflict management structures, CCMG documented numerous violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct throughout its observation initiatives that were reported and brought to the attention of the ECZ, but no action was taken. CCMG urges the ECZ to continue taking practical steps to enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, and to transparently investigate all cases in order to identify perpetrators and sanction them accordingly. Beyond concerns of politically-motivated violence and destruction of property, CCMG reported other Electoral Code of Conduct violations. These included incidents of threats and harassment, traditional leaders endorsing specific political parties and candidates and the inappropriate use of government resources and personnel, that were not investigated or sanctioned by anybody. CCMG noted that the establishment of campaign schedules by ward may decrease politically-motivated violence and therefore calls on the ECZ to continue to develop these schedules in collaboration with contesting parties and also to enforce their use.
- ***Engagement with Political Parties and Stakeholders on the Code:*** ECZ should increase its engagement with political parties, the police, and other stakeholders, including traditional leaders and civil servants, to ensure broad-based understanding of the Electoral Code of Conduct, as well as SI35 or any other SIs that may be produced in future.

Electoral Procedures:

- ***Accreditation:*** The ECZ's new election day accreditation procedures for citizen monitors was unnecessarily burdensome and lacked uniform application across all districts. This was contrary to best

principles stated by the Election Commissions Forum of the SADC Region, of which the ECZ is a member. Further, the new procedures were announced late in the electoral cycle, giving citizen monitors little time to plan and respond. In addition, despite presenting all required documents, 31 election day CCMG monitors were not provided with an official accreditation card due to district election officials having differing interpretation of accreditation requirements. A group of CSOs with interests in citizen observation, including CCMG, have developed a detailed set of recommendations on accreditation to bring Zambia's accreditation procedures in line with international and regional best practices and requirements and will engage ECZ to improve the accreditation process for future elections. CCMG also urges the ECZ to thoroughly train staff on the role of monitors to avoid accredited monitors being denied access to registration centers or polling stations as was experienced throughout the 2021 electoral cycle.

Specifically, the ECZ should: 1) explicitly note and train their officers that accreditation to a specific polling station is not required, nor that ECZ officials be allowed to ask for this information as this is not necessary or good electoral practice and undermines the transparency of elections and the safety of monitors; 2) set timelines and requirements well in advance and in consultation with relevant stakeholders to reduce confusion and congestion; 3) provide a longer timeframe for accreditation; 4) implement a system that eliminates the excessive administrative burden for accreditation and the potential for incorrect application of procedures; and 5) establish a hotline to handle issues related to accreditation and thoroughly train its staff on accreditation procedures.

- **Voter IDs and Ballot Papers:** The ECZ Election Officer's Handbook calls for polling officials to write Voter ID numbers on the ballot paper counterfoil. Because both the ballot paper and the counterfoil have a unique serial number, the writing of Voter ID numbers on the counterfoil makes it possible, though it would be challenging, to determine how a voter marked his/her ballot thereby compromising the secrecy of the ballot. CCMG calls on the ECZ to re-examine this procedure in order to ensure the secrecy of the vote and protection of the voter
- **Procedures for Electoral Process Participation of Incarcerated Persons:** Based on the lessons learned in the 2021 electoral cycle, CCMG calls on the ECZ to codify detailed procedures for the participation of the incarcerated persons in key electoral processes, such as voter registration, access to voter education and campaign materials, and election day voting, as well as the rights of political parties to campaign to these constituents and also for monitors to observe voting in correctional facilities where polling districts are located in such. CCMG proposes that the ECZ not locate polling stations in correctional facilities and that inmates should vote at the polling station nearest to their facility, to avoid opportunities for manipulation.
- **Diaspora Voting:** CCMG calls on the ECZ to consult stakeholders and provide a roadmap for the operationalization of diaspora voting mechanisms.
- **Data Driven Electoral Procedures:** CCMG recommends that electoral procedures should be informed by data to ensure enhanced inclusion, credibility and equity in electoral processes. These include:
 - *Boundary Delimitation:* The current delimitation of Zambia's constituencies does not provide equity of the vote, with the voting magnitude or deviation in the number of voters per parliamentary seat in 2021 varying from Lufubu (Central Province) with 11,411 voters to Kanyama (Lusaka Province) with 177,495. The ECZ should incorporate voting magnitude analysis into its boundary delimitation procedures.
 - *Voter Registration:* The targets for voter registration and the deployment plan (staffing and kits) should be guided by an analysis of the voting age population (VAP) based on census data from the Zambia Statistics Agency (ZAMSTATS). The ECZ should publish its voter registration data by phase and determine any extension of voter registration based on the success rate of registration against the voting age population in any given catchment area. The failure to do so for the 2020 voter registration exercise was a missed opportunity to

success and credibility of the exercise. Furthermore, any extension of voter registration should be driven by success rates against targets to alleviate any under registration.

- *Reduce Number of Voters per Polling Station:* On election day, multiple polling stations experienced long lines and congestion, with the potential to discourage potential voters and increase tensions at polling stations. CCMG recommends that the ECZ reduce the number of voters assigned to a polling station and establish additional polling stations to reduce congestion. In 2021, there were 2995 polling stations with over 800 registered voters. With polling stations open for 12 hours or 720 minutes, processing more than a voter per minute is unreasonable.
 - *Accessibility and Inclusion:* Given that the ECZ collected information on voters' disabilities in the voter registration exercise, the ECZ should analyse this data for use in improving the accessibility of electoral processes and the provision of additional materials and establish accessibility benchmarks, including the public release of its disability action plans and budget.
- **Legal Framework for Elections: Maintain Transparency of Election Results Through Independent Monitoring:** The Electoral Process Act and the Electoral Process Amendment Act No. 32 of 2021 clearly outline that the Electoral Commission of Zambia is the legally mandated body charged with announcing the official election results. CSOs who engage in election monitoring, including CCMG through the announcement of its PVT estimates, which are not election results, enhance the transparency of electoral processes and should be accorded all measures to continue to collect and disseminate information related to polling station and totalling centre results.
 - **Independent Voter Register Audit:** CCMG recommends that provisions in the electoral legal framework be made to allow an independent voter register audit (one not contracted by the ECZ), and that an independent group be allowed to conduct field tests of the register through verifying a sample of voters' information in the register, which is currently prohibited by SI 80 of 2020. This will help to assure credibility of the register to all stakeholders. Therefore, the ECZ should be required to the release of the register to stakeholders for analysis, and should also be required to release the targets, based on census data, for voter the voter registration exercise, well in advance of the start of the exercise.

Voter Registration:

- CCMG recommends that appropriate legislation be developed for online registration/pre-registration, that the process for the development of a new register or an update be codified, and that legislation be developed to enable a future civil register using existing forms of government ID, including digital ID. CCMG also calls for further codification and implementation of cost-effective continuous voter registration, the codification of any necessary period for mobile voter registration, with clear requirement for coordination between voter registration and NRC issuance and with a targeted voter education period prior to any such exercise. Furthermore, a longer time period and procedures for addressing under-registration in certain areas of the country using data should be established. Furthermore, a longer time period and procedures for addressing under-registration using data should be established.
- **Codify Rights of Monitors and Observers:** CCMG recommends that the rights of accredited monitors and observers be codified in the legal framework for elections. This will ensure reasonable accommodation in the law their accreditation, and freedom of access to election venues and information, without the establishment of any limits to the number of monitors per observer group or having overburdensome accreditation procedures.
- **Code of Conduct Enforcement:** CCMG continues to call on the ECZ to ensure timely, transparent and equitable enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct. Specifically;
 - Offenses should be clearly divided by level of severity, with separate procedures, timelines and penalties/sanctions in law;
 - In line with the Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence, "The Electoral Process Act of 2016 should be amended to establish an Electoral Fast

Track Court to resolve electoral violence related matters and other electoral disputes expeditiously”;

- The law should codify key transparency measures, including a provision for all complaints related to offenses be made public on the ECZ website within 24hrs of receipt, and that the proceedings of any hearings on breaches of the Code be made public;
 - All ECZ officials be required to report any breaches of the Electoral Code of Conduct, with this requirement included in their oath of office.
- **Appointment of Commissioners and Financial Independence of ECZ:** CCMG recommends that the legal provisions for the appointment and dismissal of ECZ Commissioners are revised to ensure transparency and enhance public confidence in the Commission’s autonomy, by removing the possibility for undue influence and thus promote independent decision making by the Commission. CCMG also recommends that the financial independence of the ECZ be guaranteed by law through the Finance Act.
 - **Boundary Delimitation:** CCMG recommends that the legal framework be revised to set parameters that are consistent with international principles for deviations within a reasonable range (1-5%) between electoral districts concerning the ratio of citizens to representative in legislative chambers
 - **Public Order Act:** CCMG calls for the Public Order Act to be repealed and replaced or revised following a broad-based consultative process, taking into consideration past recommendations from civil society.
 - **Amend Legislation on Withdrawal, Resignation or Death of a Candidate:** CCMG calls on all electoral stakeholders to engage in reforming the Constitution to no longer require the postponement of elections and fresh nominations processes in the case of the withdrawal, resignation or death of a candidate. While such a scenario is regrettable, the postponement of the election creates uncertainty and potentially significant cost burdens for both the ECZ and parties and candidates.
 - **Freedom of Information Bill and Open Election Data:** CCMG calls for the passage of the Freedom of Information Bill to enhance transparency and accountability of Zambia’s institutions, including the Electoral Commission of Zambia. As noted above under the ECZ recommendations, CCMG calls for the codification of access to key electoral data, including ECZ training manuals and electoral procedures, release of polling station/voter registration centre data to observers/monitors. This also includes the release of polling-station level results in an analysable format, staff and resource deployment, and voter registration data and targets.
 - **Mobile National Registration Card Issuance:** CCMG calls for the issuance of NRCs to be codified within the legal framework through clear procedures to ensure that this important exercise takes place without the possibility of political interference and in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner, with the rights of monitors/observers and the release of key data included in the legal framework.
 - **Political Party Finance:** In order to enhance transparency, discourage corruption and abuse of office, and decrease the risk for state capture, CCMG calls for the enactment of a campaign finance law to include financial reporting requirements for political parties and candidates. The reporting should be available in a timely and easily accessible and analysable format, and with enforcement provisions from a mandated body.
 - **Cyber Security and Cybercrimes Act:** CCMG calls for the immediate repeal of the Cyber Security and Cybercrimes Act as the legislation restricts freedom of expression and human rights.
 - **Media, ZNBC and IBA Authority:** CCMG calls for the reform of ZNBC into a true public service broadcaster, with the enactment of transparent safeguards against political influence, and internal checks and balances, with a legally mandated oversight body. CCMG also calls for the codification of

of airtime allocation on ZNBC, which should be increased from the small allocation mandated by the ECZ in the 2021 campaign period.

- **Political Neutrality of Traditional Leaders:** CCMG calls for the enhancement of the requirements for the traditional leaders to remain neutral. This provision should be included in the Electoral Code of Conduct
- **Inclusion of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities:** In order for Zambia's government to more accurately reflect its diverse population in decision making, CCMG recommends that Zambia considers adopting the Mixed Member Electoral System.

Ministry of Home Affairs:

- **National Registration Card (NRC) Issuance:** CCMG and other stakeholders believe that the issuance of National Registration Cards (NRCs), particularly through the mobile exercises, is a key part of the electoral cycle. As such, greater transparency and accountability is required to ensure the credibility of the exercise. CCMG calls on the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) through the Department of Passports, National Registration, and Citizenship (DPNRC) to:
 - Engage in consultations with stakeholders on the procedures and deployment exercise, and to explore collaboration with the Electoral Commission of Zambia on timing of mobile exercises to ensure that eligible voters are not disenfranchised. Conducting joint voter registration and mobile NRC issuance exercises, will help to save costs. In addition, the MoHA should work towards linking NRC registration and ECZ voter registration system so that voter's cards are automatically generated upon a citizen reaching voting age;
 - Publicise data-driven schedules, targets (using ZAMSTATS population estimates), and periodic progress reports on the issuance of NRCs, including disaggregated data;
 - Allow for observation of the mobile NRC issuance exercise by observer groups, and independent auditing of records of NRC issuance.

Public Service Management Division (PSMD) and Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU):

- **De-Politicization of Civil Service:** CCMG urges PSMD to take reasonable steps to ensure that civil servants/public officials refrain from actively participating in politics and remain politically neutral and professional at all times, including development/publication of sanctions for civil servants who abuse government resource and taking disciplinary action against erring civil servants. CCMG noted multiple incidents of civil servants attending political events, including using their influence to support a particular political party or candidate, and abusing public resources for political purposes.
- **De-Politicization of DMMU Response to Disasters:** CCMG documented multiple instances of DMMU goods distributed in a politicised manner or by persons affiliated with political parties. CCMG calls on the DMMU to investigate the reports of this practice and hold the perpetrators to account, and to further guard against these issues in future through the establishment and enforcement of appropriate whistle-blower and disciplinary mechanisms, including a development of specified sanctions.

Zambia Police:

- **Public Order Act (POA) Enforcement:** CCMG notes the prejudiced application of the POA by the Police in the 2021 electoral cycle, and so urges the Police to apply this law equitably to all citizens and particularly political actors, and not to use this act to unfairly disadvantage candidates and political parties in the electoral process. Furthermore, Police should implement an online meeting management system, in which meeting inquiries, as well as decisions by Police and the reasoning for those decisions are accessible to the public. Furthermore, the Police should support the repeal or revision of the Act to prevent such abuses in the future.

Excessive Use of Force: CCMG noted incidents of the use of excessive force by the police and so calls on the Police Command to properly train and hold accountable all its police units, that is in the habit of using excessive force. Live or rubber ammunition and tear gas should only be used as a last resort when all de-escalation measures have been exhausted.

Media/Independent Broadcasting Authority:

- **Fair Coverage of Opposition Candidates/Political Parties:** CCMG and other stakeholders noted unequal coverage of opposition political parties and candidates by public media during the campaign period. Therefore, we call on the public media and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) to ensure fair, non-discriminatory media access by all political parties and candidates, and to revise the legal framework to include the public broadcaster, ZNBC, under the IBA authority or another mandated oversight body. CCMG further calls for transparent reform of ZNBC into a true public service broadcaster, free from political influence or pressures. CCMG also calls for mandated airtime allocations, increased from those set by the ECZ during the 2021 campaign period to allow Zambians to receive information on parties and candidates' platforms equally.

ZICTA:

- **Uphold Access to the Internet:** Conduct a review to determine if additional legislation is required to ensure that future internet shutdowns/slowdowns do not occur, especially during elections.

Ministry of Defense:

- **Use of Military in Elections:** Establish a law or procedures, in consultation with stakeholders, related to the use of military forces in the context of elections.
- **Review Use of Airspace Restrictions:** During the 2021 Elections, CCMG witnessed restrictions in the use of Zambian airspace for opposition political parties. Therefore, we recommend that a thorough review of airspace restrictions for political parties when participating in electoral processes be conducted and that guidelines for the use of airspace during elections be developed in a transparent manner, in consultation with stakeholders.

Traditional and Religious Leaders:

- **Maintain Strict Political Neutrality:** CCMG noted numerous incidents of traditional and religious leaders across the country using their influence to support a political party or candidate. CCMG urges these leaders to practice strict political neutrality to provide for a level playing field and freedom of expression for Zambia's citizens as is required of them in the Electoral Code of Conduct.


ZAMBIA 2021 GENERAL ELECTION



10 PROVINCES



116 DISTRICTS




7,023,449 Registered Voters



156 Constituencies



12,152 Polling Stations





www.ccmgzambia.org
info@ccmgzambia.org

Facebook: Christian Churches Monitoring Group
Instagram: Christian Churches Monitoring Group
Twitter: @ccmgzambia

ZAMBIA 2021 GENERAL ELECTION

CCMG has deployed 1,600 monitors and Mobile supervisors to every Province, District and Contiguency





10 PROVINCES



116 DISTRICTS



7,023,449 Registered Voters




156 Constituencies


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10 PROVINCES



116 DISTRICTS



7,023,449 Registered Voters




156 Constituencies


ZAMBIA 2021 GENERAL ELECTION

Candidates Analysis


Presidential Candidates Analysis



16 Presidential Candidates




15 Male Presidential Candidates




1 Female Presidential Candidates


Vice Presidential Candidates Analysis



16 Vice Presidential Candidates



11 Male Vice Presidential Candidates



5 Female Vice Presidential Candidates

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Overview

i) About the Christian Churches Monitoring Group

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) is a consortium of four faith-based organizations formed to help promote credible elections through non-partisan citizen monitoring. The CCMG consortium members include:

- Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ)
- Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ)
- Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflections (JCTR); and
- Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB), through Caritas Zambia

The CCMG was founded ahead of the 2015 presidential by-elections, and is strictly non-partisan and does not render support to any political party or candidate whatsoever.

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During the lead up to the 2021 general elections, CCMG implemented an electoral process monitoring project to enhance the transparency and integrity of the electoral process through monitoring, documenting, and reporting on various electoral activities and events. Starting from March 2021, CCMG monitored key electoral processes, and these included; Voter Registration, Candidate Nominations, political parties' behaviour, preparations by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), voter education, and the general campaign environment through its long-term observation project, which deployed 330 long-term observers (LTOs).

On election day, CCMG conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) for the presidential election, deploying well trained and accredited monitors to a representative random sample of 1,500 polling stations across the country, at which 866,689 voters were registered (463,625 women and 403,064 men). CCMG deployed a total of 1,681 fully trained and accredited monitors, inclusive of the PVT mobile monitors in all constituencies and districts across the country.

CCMG is a member of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) and upholds the rights, responsibilities and ethical obligations of non-partisan monitoring as outlined in the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations.

ii) 2021 Electoral Cycle - Overview, Context and Background

Since the return to multi-party politics in 1991, Zambia has held general elections seven times, with the election date enshrined in the constitution since 2016. Zambia's elections have generally been characterised by largely well managed electoral processes and peaceful transitions. However, increased political competition and polarisation since 2016, combined with a downturn in the country's economic indicators, created an environment characterised by closing democratic space and incidents of politically-motivated violence. Following the 2016 elections, the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) petitioned the election results at the Constitutional Court. However, the petition was dismissed on a technicality without being heard. Later in 2016, Hakainde Hichilema was detained and charged with treason, and although the charges were ultimately dropped, other opposition figures also faced police or legal proceedings against them in the lead up to the 2021 elections.

The media landscape was restricted during this period and while CCMG did not undertake media monitoring, MISA-Zambia's reports noted that the media coverage of opposition parties, including UPND, was significantly less than that of PF. Particularly concerning was the inequitable coverage of political parties by the public broadcaster, the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), which is mandated to provide equitable coverage.

Furthermore, the 2020 shutdown of Prime TV and the IBA finding of professional misconduct by Muvi TV raised serious questions about media freedom.

In addition to the arrests and charges against opposition party members or private citizens that either appeared to have a political motive and/or infringed upon their human rights noted above, civil society organisations raised concerns about the implementation of the Public Order Act (POA), the COVID-19 mitigation measures, and the potential to use the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act passed in March 2021 for political persecution.

Beginning with boundary delimitation, the ECZ completed all key electoral processes according to the electoral timeline (see Section V below); however, multiple stakeholders raised concerns about the ECZ's information sharing, transparency and lack of consultations regarding key elements of the electoral process. Sixteen presidential candidates were duly nominated, however stakeholders raised concerns about the nomination fees, particularly their impact on aspiring candidates from traditionally marginalised groups. The 2021 electoral cycle also saw the first registration and voting of incarcerated individuals following the Constitutional Court's 2017 ruling, as well as the conversion of polling streams into polling stations, a recommendation from multiple stakeholders from 2016 that greatly enhanced transparency of election results.





Legal Framework and Election Administration

The new constitution, enacted on January 5, 2016, in Article 56 (1) of the Constitution provides for a date for general elections, with the 2021 general elections falling on the 12 August 2021. There were four elections held at the same time: Presidential, National Assembly, Mayoral/Council Chairperson and Ward Councillor. Article 47 (1) speaks to election to office of the president which shall be conducted directly, under a majoritarian electoral system, where the winning candidate must receive more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast to avoid a run-off ballot, while sub article (2) and (3) provide for election to National Assembly and Councils under a first-past-the-post electoral system.

In addition, article 110 provides for election of a vice president who shall be the running mate and article 106 (5) (a) provides for assumption of office of the president by the vice president while article 106 (4) (a), (b) and (c) further provides for the conditions under which the office of the president becomes vacant. Article 100 (1) and (2) provide the qualification and disqualifications for nomination as a presidential candidate, which also apply to the running mate.

i) Legal and Administrative Framework

As noted above, the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia is the primary law governing elections. Subsidiary and related legislation governing electoral processes and participation include: the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 as amended in 2020 (This Act also contains the Electoral Code of Conduct); The Electoral Commission Act No. 25 of 2016; Statutory Instrument No. 81 of 2021 which regulates voter registration; Referendum Amendment Act No. 5 of 2015; and the Public Order Act (POA) which regulates the right to assemble. The POA provides that any person intending to assemble a public meeting, or procession, should notify law enforcement authorities in writing of such intent seven days before the meeting.

A. Registration and Voting of Persons in Lawful Custody

In 2016, following a challenge to section 9(1) of the Electoral Process Act, the Constitutional Court ruled that persons in lawful custody and those whose freedom of movement is restricted under a written law are entitled to vote in future elections.

The ruling thus found that the provisions of the Electoral Process Act that provide for the disenfranchisement of persons in custody are unconstitutional and void. In January 2020, the Electoral Commission of Zambia constituted a technical committee to lead the process of operationalizing the right to vote by persons in lawful custody, in accordance with the court judgment. For the 2021 electoral cycle, the ECZ conducted the registration of persons in lawful custody, registering 14,084 of an estimated eligible 21,000, approximately 14,000 of whom voted in August 2021.

The formation of a technical committee and the development of procedures to allow for the registration and voting of persons in lawful custody was an important process to enable these citizens to enjoy their full democratic rights. However, critical areas still require full clarification or codification, namely provision for voter education for persons in lawful custody, freedom to campaigning to these citizens and provisions for monitoring their registration and voting.

B. COVID-19 Legislation and Standard Operating Procedures

In March 2020 Ministry of Health issued a Statutory Instrument No. 22 of 2020 (The Public Health (infected areas) (coronavirus disease 2019) Regulation 2020). Due to the rising COVID-19 cases and the need to conduct the 12th August general elections, the Electoral Commission of Zambia and Ministry of Health created a technical committee to develop procedures and guidelines for conducting elections amidst the pandemic. On 30 April 2021, the ECZ released the COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), providing guidance on how electoral activities including voter registration, nomination period, campaign period and election day activities should be conducted. The SOPs provided standard procedures for each of the electoral activities, including: provision of handwashing/sanitising equipment for ECZ staff and venues to be used in electoral processes, compulsory use of masks, use of social distancing, use of temperature checks and some limits on the numbers of monitors/observers. On the latter, a further SOP for observers, monitors and party agents was released in July.

While it was important for ECZ to develop these SOPs, some provisions posed a restriction on the extent to which election monitors and observers conducted their observation/monitoring, for instance the provision for monitors/observers to alternate during observation can potentially compromise the quality of observation.

ii) International and Regional Standards

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “the will of the people shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be a secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” This provides the basis for elections to serve as a peaceful means of expressing people's political preference, the right of every citizen to participate in this activity by voting or running for office, and for the formation of democratic governments through democratic elections reflecting the will of the people.

Every citizen regardless of race, religion, gender, nationality has a right to participate in a genuine election. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;” and “to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by the universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.” Zambia has ratified several international treaties which should be a basis for genuine, periodic and inclusive elections; including the UDHR, mentioned above, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

In addition, Zambia is also governed by regional instruments, notably the 2015 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, the 2002 African Union Declaration of Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. SADC member states are required to adhere to principles in the conduct of democratic elections which include: full participation of the citizens in the political process; freedom of association; political tolerance; regular intervals for elections as provided for by the respective national constitutions; equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media; equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for; independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; voter education, and; acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent national electoral authorities in accordance with the law of the land and challenging of the election results as provided for in the law of the land.

iii) Election Management Structure

According to the Zambian Constitution, the Electoral Commission of Zambia has the sole mandate to conduct national elections and implement activities in the electoral process. Article 229 describes the formation of the Electoral Commission, which should have offices in all the provinces and progressively in districts. The Electoral Commission Act 25 of 2016 provides for the composition of the Electoral Commission and its operations. The Commission consists of a Chairperson and not more than four other members appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly (Section 4 (1) (b)), for a term not exceeding seven years. In addition, it sets out the circumstances under which the President may remove a member of the Commission. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be a person who has held, or qualified to hold high judicial office or any other suitably qualified person. Whereas the Chairman and members of the Commission constitute the policy making body, the Electoral Commission Act 24 provides for the Commission to appoint a director who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission and is responsible for: management and administration of the Commission and implementation of the decisions of the Commission. The Director is assisted by such staff as the Commission appoints by statutory instrument on such terms and conditions as the Commission determines.

iv) Detailed Election Timeline

In June 2020, the ECZ gave an overview of its electoral calendar to CSOs and the media at a meeting organised by the Commission, however, the electoral calendar was not published until February 6, 2021 following calls by stakeholders for its official release. While the Commission released the election calendar to stakeholders and the public through a government gazette as provided for by law, the February 6, 2021 calendar diverged significantly from the June 2020 version.

Election Timeline as Implemented for the 2021 General Elections

No.	Activity	Start Date	End Date
1	Registration of Voters	9 November 2020	20 December 2020
2	Voter Registration Consolidation of Voter Registration Data	30 December 2020	31 January 2021
3	Voter Register Details Objections & Verifications/Electronic Inspection of the Provisional Register of Voters (USSD Platform/Website)	7 February 2021	7 May 2021
4	Physical Inspection of the Provisional Register of Voters	29 March 2021	7 April 2021
5	Certification of the Register of Voters	9 May 2021	9 May 2021
6	Nominations		
i	Payment of Nominations Fees - Presidential Elections	1 May 2021	9 May 2021
ii	Payment of Nominations Fees - National Assembly and Local	1 May 2021	16 May 2021
iii	Processing of Supporters	10 May 2021	15 May 2021
iv	Nominations Days - Presidential Election	17 May 2021	20 May 2021
v	Nominations Day - Member of Parliament Election	17 May 2021	17 May 2021
	Election		
vi	Nominations Day - Mayors and Council Chairperson's Election	18 May 2021	18 May 2021
vii	Nominations Day - Ward Councillor	19 May 2021	19 May 2021
viii	Publication of Validly Nominated Candidates	10 July 2021	10 July 2021
7	Campaign Period	14 May 2021	11 August 2021
8	Accreditation		
	Local Monitors	1 July 2021	5 August 2021
	International Observers	1 st July 2021	5 August 2021
	Results Centre	6 August 2021	9 August 2021
9	Nominations Petition	15 May 2021	11 June 2021
10	Election Day		
	Election Day (06:00hrs – 18:00hrs)	12 August 2021	12 August 2021

Pre-Election Observation Methodology and Findings

Elections are not a single day event but rather a process. CCMG approached the 2021 general elections observation following the electoral cycle approach in its programs. As such it observed the pre-election, the election day and post-election periods. This section details the methodologies and findings for the key processes observed during the pre-election period.

i) Boundary Delimitation and CCMG Boundary Delimitation Monitoring

Boundary delimitation is the process of mapping and re-aligning of electoral boundaries, these are constituencies, wards, polling districts and provinces in order to effectively and efficiently conduct elections. The delimitation of electoral boundaries is a key electoral process guided by the fundamental principles of impartiality, equality, representativeness, non-discrimination and transparency. Therefore, criteria and procedures used in delimitation should ensure the “equality of the vote,” or the principle of equal suffrage, which demands that all voters are represented in the legislature on a (roughly) equal basis. In Zambia, boundary delimitation process is provided for under the legal framework in Article 229 of the Constitution No. 2 of 2016 and the Electoral Process Act No. 53 of 2016. These pieces of legislation provide the mandate for the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to conduct delimitation of constituencies, wards and polling districts. Boundary delimitation is implemented on but not limited to the following principles; the permissible ratio between number of citizens per member of parliament, deviations between electoral districts concerning the ratio of citizens to representative by constituency and non-discrimination.

a. Monitoring of Boundary Delimitation Process

In addition to observing delimitation processes, CCMG was able to conduct an analysis of the outcomes of boundary delimitation, in this case, the registration of voters per constituency created as a result of the process. This analysis was done on a constituency level and analysed the voting magnitude of each constituency, and how the voting magnitude (number of voters per seat) deviates from the average. For example, if a new constituency comprises 10,000 voters per seat whereas the average number of voters per seat is 5,000 per seat nation-wide, the boundary delimitation process did not uphold the principle of equal suffrage.

1. 2016 Voter Registration Boundary Delimitation Analysis

Based on CCMG's analysis of the 2016 voter registration figures by constituency, the current constituency boundaries were found to be in contravention of the principle of equal suffrage or equality of legislative representation. The number of registered voters per constituency varied significantly, resulting in the constituency with the smallest number of registered voters in the 2016 register (Lufubu Constituency with 9,080) having a relative voting power of 473%, deviating from the average number of registered voters by 373%. At the other end of the spectrum in the 2016 register, the constituency with the largest number of registered voters (Mandevu Constituency with 148,889 registered voters) had a relative voting power of 29%, deviating from the average number of registered voters by 71%.

Table 1 – Top 10 Overrepresented Constituencies – 2016 Register

Province	District	Constituency	Total Registered Voters (2016)	% Deviation from Average	Relative Voting Power
Central	Ngabwe	Lufubu	9,080	-373%	473%
North-Western	Zambezi	Zambezi West	12,067	-256%	356%
Lusaka	Luangwa	Feira	13227	-225%	325%
Luapula	Chembe	Chembe	14,166	-203%	303%
Western	Mitete	Mitete	14,605	-194%	294%
Western	Mwandi	Mwandi	14806	-190%	290%
Luapula	Lunga	Luapula	14,926	-188%	288%
Western	Kalabo	Liuwa	15,888	-170%	270%
Western	Mulobezi	Mulobezi	16509	-160%	260%
Southern	Monze	Moomba	18,172	-136%	236%

Average number of registered voters per constituency: 42,983

Table 2 – Top 10 Underrepresented Constituencies – 2016 Register

Province	District	Constituency	Total Registered Voters (2016)	% Deviation from Average	Relative Voting Power
Lusaka	Lusaka	Mandevu	148,889	71%	29%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Munali	144,284	70%	30%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Kanyama	136,198	68%	32%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Matero	130,408	67%	33%
Central	Kapiri Mposhi	Kapiri Mposhi	103,986	59%	41%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Kabwata	100,404	57%	43%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Chawama	97,608	56%	44%
Southern	Livingstone	Livingstone	84,109	49%	51%
North-Western	Solwezi	Solwezi Central	81,344	47%	53%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka Central	81,236	47%	53%

Average number of registered voters per constituency: 42, 983

b. 2021 Voter Registration Boundary Delimitation Analysis

Following the conclusion of the 2021 voter registration exercise, CCMG conducted analysis on the voter registration figures by constituency in order to analyse the boundary delimitation based on the CCMG conducted analysis on the voter registration figures by constituency new registration rates. CCMG found out that the current boundaries under which the 2021 general elections were held, and after the exercise was conducted in 2019, they still lacked equal suffrage and the equality of legislative representation, just like the case with the 2016 register of voters. The number of registered voters per constituency continues to vary significantly making some constituencies to be overrepresented while others are underrepresented. The constituency with the smallest number of registered voters in the 2021 register (Lufubu with 11,411 registered voters) has a 395% relative voting power, deviating with 295% from the average number of registered voters. In addition, the constituency with the largest number of registered voters in the 2021 register (Kanyama with 177,495 registered voters) holds the least relative voting power (25%), deviating from the average number of registered voters with 75%. In conclusion, a total of 55 constituencies have lower than the average number of registered voters with more than 10% deviation, while 83 constituencies have higher than average number of registered voters with a deviation of over 10%. Only 18 constituencies fit within a standard deviation from the average and can be said to comply with the principles of equal suffrage and equal legislative representation.

b. *2021 Voter Registration Boundary Delimitation Analysis*

Following the conclusion of the 2021 voter registration exercise, CCMG conducted analysis on the voter registration figures by constituency in order to analyse the boundary delimitation based on the CCMG conducted analysis on the voter registration figures by constituency new registration rates. CCMG found out that the current boundaries under which the 2021 general elections were held, and after the exercise was conducted in 2019, they still lacked equal suffrage and the equality of legislative representation, just like the case with the 2016 register of voters. The number of registered voters per constituency continues to vary significantly making some constituencies to be overrepresented while others are underrepresented. The constituency with the smallest number of registered voters in the 2021 register (Lufubu with 11,411 registered voters) has a 395% relative voting power, deviating with 295% from the average number of registered voters. In addition, the constituency with the largest number of registered voters in the 2021 register (Kanyama with 177,495 registered voters) holds the least relative voting power (25%), deviating from the average number of registered voters with 75%. In conclusion, a total of 55 constituencies have lower than the average number of registered voters with more than 10% deviation, while 83 constituencies have higher than average number of registered voters with a deviation of over 10%. Only 18 constituencies fit within a standard deviation from the average and can be said to comply with the principles of equal suffrage and equal legislative representation.

Table 3 – Top 10 Overrepresented Constituencies – 2021 Register

Province	District	Constituency	Total Registered Voters (2021)	% Deviation from Average	Relative Voting Power
Central	Ngabwe	Lufubu	11,411	-295%	395%
North-Western	Zambezi	Zambezi West	11,676	-286%	386%
Western	Mwandi	Mwandi	14,049	-220%	320%
Western	Mitete	Mitete	14,130	-219%	319%
Lusaka	Luangwa	Feira	14,288	-215%	315%
Western	Kalabo	Liuwa	14,595	-208%	308%
Western	Mulobezi	Mulobezi	14,729	-206%	306%
Western	Mongu	Nalikwanda	16,597	-171%	271%
Southern	Monze	Moomba	16,895	-166%	266%
Western	Kaoma	Mangango	16,992	-165%	265%

Average number of registered voters per constituency: 45,022


Table 4 – Top 10 Underrepresented Constituencies – 2021 Register

Province	District	Constituency	Total Registered Voters (2021)	% Deviation from Average	Relative Voting Power
Lusaka	Lusaka	Kanyama	177,495	75%	25%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Mandevu	162,419	72%	28%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Munali	151,573	70%	30%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Matero	141,668	68%	32%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Kabwata	108,729	59%	41%
Lusaka	Chongwe	Chongwe	94,677	52%	48%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka Central	93,367	52%	48%
Lusaka	Lusaka	Chawama	92,879	52%	48%
Central	Kapiri Mposhi	Kapiri Mposhi	89,852	50%	50%
Eastern	Chipata	Chipata Central	82,550	45%	55%

Average number of registered voters per constituency: 45,022

Therefore, the analysis on the 2016 and 2021 voter registration figures shows that the large constituencies with high numbers of registered voters continue to hold a small relative voting power, while the small constituencies hold a very high relative voting power per voter

Unannounced Mobile NRC Issuance Incidents per Province



iii) Voter Registration and CCMG Voter Registration Monitoring

CCMG observed all four phases and the extension of the 2020 voter registration exercise. As part of this observation effort, 298 CCMG observers were deployed to a statistically representative random sample of 1,000 registration centres across the four voter registration phases. The sampled registration centres were located in every province, district and constituency of Zambia.

This deployment followed ECZ's announcement to create an entirely new register of voters with processes planned to begin on 9 November and end on 12 December 2020 for a period of 30 days. While Zambia has used both new and updated voter registers in the past with notable strengths and weaknesses, there was insufficient stakeholder engagement prior to the decision to create a new register to build broader consensus and confidence in the process. The ECZ said its decision to create a new register of voters for the 2021 general election was based on the understanding of the Commission that the 2016 register was inaccurate as it had an estimate of 1.4 million deceased voters.

While CCMG monitor reports demonstrated that the voter registration exercise largely adhered to procedures and resulted in very few questionable registrations of ineligible persons; a number of shortcomings on the process were documented. Notable among them were the late announcement of the registration period, a shorter registration period than in 2016, unreasonably long lines at some registration centres, significant disparities in registration centres staffing levels across provinces, lack of transparency about procedures, staffing and kit deployment and failure to provide CCMG monitors with detailed registration information. Additionally, the refusal by the ECZ to permit an independent audit of the register further undermined transparency and was a missed opportunity to enhance confidence in the final register of voters.

Detailed Voter Registration Observation Findings

CCMG's observers used specific checklists and critical incident forms to systematically collect information on opening, setup, registration and closing of voter registration centres. CCMG's observers sent their observation reports via coded SMS to the CCMG Data Centre where information was analysed and any critical incident reports were followed up. CCMG's observers monitored the voter registration exercise three times in each of the four phases of the voter registration exercise, ensuring that each of the 298 Observers monitored at four different registration centres. Based on reports from CCMG's observers at a nationally representative random sample of registration centres, CCMG had the following key findings:

i) Voter Registration Planning and Logistics

Throughout the pre-voter registration period and during the voter registration exercise, the ECZ consistently failed to provide basic information about the Commission's planning and logistics for the voter registration exercise. The lack of basic information undermined the ability of the public as well as key stakeholders such as political parties and civil society to understand, evaluate and participate in the process. CCMG repeatedly raised concerns about the transparency of the ECZ and called on the Commission to take concrete steps to provide timely, accurate and comprehensive details on voter registration. CCMG and other stakeholders called on the ECZ to release the number of staff and kits deployed to each province, district and constituency, as well as the detailed deployment plans and key timelines, to no avail. Failure to provide this information led to unnecessary speculation and undercut the credibility of the voter registration process.

CCMG noted that 47% of registration centres were staffed by only one official, improving from 53% in Phase 1 to 41% in Phase 4. CCMG noted that the aggregate number of staff deployed at the start of the exercise provided by the ECZ at 2,579 was not sufficient to staff each of the 2,158 - 2,293 mobile voter registration centres active per phase with two staff persons. Furthermore, while the additional 1,100 staff deployed for Phases 3 and 4, a significant number of centres in Phase 4 remained staffed by only one ECZ official, particularly in Copperbelt (70%), North-Western (75%), Southern (53%) and Western (56%). Similarly, CCMG noted that only 63% of registration centres had back up registration kits. An average of 13% of CCMG's observers reported centres not opening, which appeared to be primarily due to district-level deployment plans inconsistencies with the national-level plan, as well as logistical challenges.

ii) Registration Adherence to Procedures

Critical materials were generally available at registration centres, and there was a high level of adherence to registration procedures with very few questionable registrations documented by CCMG observers. Based on the reports from its observers deployed to a nationally representative random sample of registration centres, CCMG found that nearly 100% of registration centres had all the critical materials with the exception of backup registration kits, which as noted above were present at 63% of registration centres. CCMG observers also documented high adherence to registration procedures, with 98% reporting that applicants showed proof of eligibility, 98% reporting that successful applicants were given a voter's card with a photo, 94% reporting that registration materials were packed away safely at the end of the day at registration centres and only 8% reporting registration centres closed before 18hrs. CCMG's registration centre observers reported on multiple types of potential questionable registration or disenfranchisement; however, CCMG's observers reported that these issues affected a small number of people per registration centre (less than five people) and a small number of registration centres: at 3% of registration centres officials refused to register individuals who appeared to be eligible; at less than 1% of registration centres, there was registration of applicants who appeared underage; and at 1% of registration centres, there was registration of people without NRCs, though this affected an average of only one person per registration centre. CCMG's observers reported that at less than 1% of registration centres there was registration of applicants who appeared to be non-Zambians.

CCMG's observers also reported on COVID-19 mitigation measures, with 77% of registration centres having hand washing or sanitising facilities; at 74% of registration centres officials wore protective wear; 59% of registration centres practiced social distancing during set-up; and at 50% of registration centres social distancing was maintained in the queue.

iii) Registrant Processing Time

Registrant processing time improved throughout the process, though because of continued high demand this improvement was not enough to reduce wait times and lines in some areas. CCMG's observers at a nationally representative random sample of registration centres reported improvement in the time it took to process the registration of a voter, from 10 minutes in Phase 1 to 9 minutes in Phase 4 and, correspondingly, an increase in the average number of people registered per day per centre from 67 in Phase 1 to 73 in Phase 4. Throughout

the exercise, these issues did not appear to have affected significantly one region of the country more than others, based on data from observers on the average number of registrants per centre per day by province or the average minutes it took to register each person per province.

iv) Communications and Transparency

The ECZ failed to provide timely and clear information about critical aspects of the voter registration exercise to stakeholders and the general public. While CCMG commends the ECZ for releasing the national-level deployment plan for Phases 1-4, the ECZ did not do so in a timely manner. This issue persisted with the announcement of the extension of the exercise, with critical details related to the timing released only two days prior to and locations only released one day prior to the extension period. This was a step back in transparency and engagement with the public on the registration process, as CCMG noted that in 2015-16 the ECZ shared accreditation procedures, registration procedures and a deployment plan in a timely manner and also shared provincial-level and demographic registration data at the end of each voter registration phase. In addition, ECZ officers throughout the exercise at 32% of registration centres refused to provide information on registration to observers, including the number of registrants per day. As a government body mandated to undertake critical exercises for the good of all Zambians, the ECZ has a duty to provide timely and comprehensive information to the public and should enhance the transparency and credibility of electoral processes by sharing important information with observers and the public.

v) Observer Access

Throughout the voter registration exercise, CCMG documented multiple challenges with access to voter registration centres for its accredited observers. Prior to the start of the exercise, CCMG noted the failure of the ECZ to publicise the procedures for accreditation for both non-partisan observers and party representatives, and experienced a delay in the processing of its observers' accreditation. Following the launch of the exercise, CCMG continued to document that 2% of its accredited observers were denied access to registration centres. All duly accredited observers should have been granted access to any registration centre without further permissions, and the number of individuals registered at a registration centre, much like the station results on election night, should be public information.

After the completion of the voter register exercise, CCMG officially wrote to the ECZ to request for an electronic copy of the voters register for purposes of conducting an independent assessment of the quality of the voters list. The ECZ declined to provide the voters register. CCMG also attempted to conduct a field test audit of the register called "People to List Test", which was later stopped by the ECZ as the exercise involved collecting voter details for purposes of verification, which is not allowed per law. The denial of access to the register as well as halting of CCMG's People to List exercise made it impossible for CCMG to conduct an independent audit of the register, and also made it impossible for both political players and observer groups to validate claims made about the quality of the register by the ECZ.



<<< CCMG Monitor Observing
Voter Register Inspection.

CCMG analysed the 2021 voter registration figures using the Voting Age Population (VAP) estimates from the Zambia Statistics Agency (ZamStats) that were released in December 2020. The use of VAP estimates to assess the quality of a voters register in terms of how well it reflects a country's population is a standard practice of election observation groups worldwide. Based on CCMG's analysis, it is important to note that while registration rates may not be identical across the country, they should be relatively uniform. Similar registration rates suggest that all eligible voters had an equal opportunity to register while significant disparities suggest under or over registration of particular communities.

Province	ECZ Registered Voters	ZamStats Estimate	VAP	% Registered
Luapula	562,230	601,058		93.5%
Eastern	896,213	973,790		92.0%
Western	447,143	507,184		88.2%
North-Western	384,452	447,661		85.9%
Northern	600,859	706,495		85.0%
Total Zambia	7,002,393	8,414,839		83.2%
Copperbelt	1,023,223	1,257,460		81.4%
Lusaka	1,241,992	1,545,892		80.3%
Muchinga	401,542	507,366		79.1%
Southern	778,099	1,005,816		77.4%
Central	666,640	862,117		77.3%

CCMG recommended that the ECZ conduct additional voter registration in provinces that were below the national average of 83.2%. CCMG also recommended the ECZ to release both the provisional and certified voter registers to allow stakeholders to review the full register as well as conduct an independent audit of the register in view of assessing its quality and building voter confidence. However, the ECZ declined these requests.

Pre-Election Long-Term Observation

Methodology

To effectively observe the general political environment leading up to the 12 August 2021, general election, CCMG recruited, trained, and deployed three hundred and thirty (330) long-term observers (LTOs). The project was aimed at systematically observing and gathering factual and verifiable information on the general political environment as well as early signs of conflict and politically motivated violence. CCMG's observers used a standardized checklist to report on the happenings in their assigned areas on a bi-weekly period, and later on a weekly basis, as the election drew near. The 330 LTOs covered all constituencies, districts and provinces in Zambia.

CCMG observers reported both issues they witnessed and issues they heard about. When a CCMG observer reported a critical incident they heard about, the CCMG Data Centre followed up with the observer to obtain additional details and to work with the observer to verify those details to the best of their ability. All findings from the long-term observation were transmitted through coded text messages and were analysed with periodical reports shared. LTOs were expected to monitor electoral activities such as voter education and information, political campaign activities, issues affecting marginalised groups (youth, women, and PWDs) in elections, election-related violence, and the use of hate speech and language that may have incited violence. CCMG's observers were also trained to report any critical incidents they witnessed or heard of immediately. Please note there may have been additional incidents of which CCMG observers were unaware during the observation period.

CCMG conducted a pre-election observation from 8 March 2021 to 11 August 2021 and a post-election observation from 13 August 2021 to 30 September 2021. All detailed analysis and reports can be found on CCMG's website⁴. The following section summarises the LTO findings over this period of time based on the LTOs reporting.

Key Findings and Highlights

Based on reports from CCMG's observers across all provinces, districts, and constituencies for the period of 8 March – 11 August 2021, the following are key findings:

- From the start of observation, CCMG observers reported eighty-five (85) incidents of politically-motivated violence, seventy-six (76) of which took place during the official campaign period. Politically-motivated violent acts increased following the start of the official campaign period on 12 May, however the suspension of in-person campaign activities appears to have correlated with a decrease in politically-motivated violence.
 - From a national perspective, 1% of observers reported political violence incidents, with 1% reported during the official campaign period.
 - In addition, 1-2% of observers nationally reported each of the following other violence-related acts: threats/intimidation, campaign material destruction, arming of supporters, wearing of military-like attire, inflammatory/defamatory language.
 - CCMG's observation data shows that while both PF and UPND engaged in politically-motivated violence and related acts, PF was identified the main participant/perpetrator in thirty-six (36) incidents against UPND's twenty (20) incidents, and an additional sixteen (16) incidents where both PF and UPND were involved and no clear perpetrator was identified. In the campaign period, PF was been the main participant/perpetrator in more political violence acts where a main participant/perpetrator could be identified, committing thirty-three (33) incidents against UPND's twenty incidents (20) incidents. In an additional thirteen (13) incidents, while both PF and UPND were involved, a clear perpetrator could not be identified.

⁴ <https://ccmgzambia.org/pre-election-observation-2021-general-elections/>

- UPND was the target in thirty-two (32) incidents with PF the victim in seventeen (17) incidents. In the campaign period, UPND was the primary target of political violence by a about two (2) to one (1) margin, with thirty (30) incidents targeting UPND and sixteen (16) with PF as the victim.
 - PF was the main participants/perpetrators in the destruction of campaign materials, threats/intimidation, and wearing of military attire incidents during the entire observation period.
- Lusaka, Copperbelt and Muchinga Provinces had the highest numbers of politically-motivated violence related incidents during the entire observation period, with nineteen (19) incidents in Lusaka, twelve (12) in Muchinga and eleven (11) in Copperbelt. Eight (8) constituencies reported three (3) or more incidents: Chinsali (Muchinga Province) reported seven (7), Kanyama (Lusaka Province) reported five (5) incidents, Chawama and Feira (both in Lusaka Province) reported four (4) incidents each, while Mumbwa (Central Province), Ndola Central (Copperbelt Province), Lukashya (Northern Province) and Mongu Central (Western Province) all reported three (3) incidents each.
 - There were thirty-seven (37) incidents that limited campaigning space during the entire campaign period with thirty-four happening during the campaign period. Twenty-nine (29) incidents affected UPND and five (5) affected PF. Police cited COVID-19 mitigation measures in shutting down twenty-two (22) of the events. In addition, CCMG observers reported two (2) incidents of police blocking the movement of the UPND party president.
 - CCMG observers reported a total of three (3) incidents of attacks on media and/or journalists. All these incidents were perpetrated by PF supporters.
 - Despite the 15 June campaign events suspension, political party activities of an estimated 50+ participants continued taking place, with PF conducting three hundred and thirty-two (332) such activities, one hundred and seventy-four (174) where held by UPND and sixty-six (66) by other parties and/or independent candidates. In the period following the campaign suspension, CCMG reports indicated that PF conducted more activities of an estimated 50+ participants than UPND by about a 2 to 1 margin.
 - Traditional and religious leader partisan endorsements of a political party/candidate favoured PF significantly during the entire observation period, with thirty-three (33) traditional leader endorsements and fourteen (14) religious leader endorsements for the party, against six (6) traditional leader endorsements and four (4) religious leader endorsements for UPND. However, at a national level, during the campaign period only 1% of CCMG observers reported that traditional or religious leaders endorsed a party/candidate.
 - The police provided somewhat more security for PF activities than for UPND and other parties' activities during the entire campaign period, with security provided to twenty-two percent (22%) of PF activities, eighteen percent (18%) of UPND activities and sixteen percent (16%) of other parties' activities, for those activities large enough to require a police presence.
 - Throughout the campaign and pre-campaign period, CCMG documented multiple instances of misuse of government resources and personnel, all but one incident of which was associated with PF. The majority of the incidents occurring in Eastern Province. In total, there were nineteen (19) uses government vehicles for political party activities, fourteen (14) endorsements/political behaviour by government civil servants (district commissioners, teachers, etc.), five (5) instances of prohibited use of government venues for political purposes, and two (2) documented instances of use of government goods (DMMU food) for political purposes.

Detailed Findings

a) Politically-Motivated Violence and Related Acts

Politically-Motivated Violence

Since the beginning of the pre-election long-term observation on 8 March 2021, CCMG observers reported a total of eighty-five (85) verified incidents of politically-motivated violence. The majority of

of these incidents (76 total), took place during the campaign period from 12 May 2021 through election day. CCMG notes that overall violence escalated immediately after the start of the official campaign period and subsided with the suspension of in-person campaigns; thus, it is likely the suspension limited the triggers of politically-motivated violence and contributed to a reduction in incidents at several points throughout the campaign period. CCMG also noted that several incidents provoked violent retaliations, suggesting that the impunity for acts of violence due to lack of adequate police response or censure by the ECZ may have contributed to escalation of violence. Acts of politically-motivated violence are subject to Zambia's Penal Code but additionally are expressly forbidden under the Electoral Code of Conduct and SI 35 of 2020 Electoral Code of Conduct Enforcement, which details additional investigations, sanctions and provisions by the ECZ.

Politically-Motivated Violence			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	8	Central	8
Copperbelt	8	Copperbelt	11
Eastern	3	Eastern	3
Luapula	6	Luapula	6
Lusaka	16	Lusaka	19
Muchinga	10	Muchinga	12
Northern	9	Northern	9
North-Western	3	North-Western	3
Southern	3	Southern	3
Western	10	Western	11
Total	76	Total	85

Politically-Motivated Violence							
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)				All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)			
Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents
PF	33	UPND	30	PF	36	UPND	32
UPND	20	PF	16	UPND	20	PF	17
PF/UPND	13	PF/UPND	13	PF/UPND	16	PF/UPND	16
PF Intra-Party	4	PF Intra-Party	4	PF Intra-Party	5	PF Intra-Party	5
PF/Independent	2	Independent	3	Unknown	2	Independent	3
UPND Intra-Party	1	PF/Independent	2	PF/Independent	2	Unknown	3
PF/Police	1	Police	2	UPND Intra-Party	1	PF/Independent	2
Unknown	1	UPND Intra-Party	1	Police	1	Police	2
Independent	1	Unknown	1	PF/Police	1	UPND Intra-Party	1
		PF/Community Members	1	Independent	1	PAC	1
		PAC	1			PF/Community Members	1
		Community Members	1			Community Members	1
		Democratic Party	1			Democratic Party	1

- **Victims:** The majority of the victims during the observation period were affiliated either with UPND or PF, with UPND as the victim in nearly a 2:1 margin over the PF. Since the beginning of the long-term observation on 8 March 2021, CCMG observers reported that UPND was the victim in thirty-two (32) incidents, with thirty (30) of those occurring after the commencement of the official campaign period from May 12. PF was the victim in seventeen (17) incidents with sixteen (16) of them occurring during the official campaign period. Additionally, there were sixteen (16) incidents where both PF and UPND were the victims. There were also multiple incidents of intra-party violence, five (5) incidents involving PF supporters, and one (1) involving UPND supporters. Other parties or people of unknown affiliation were affected as follows: three (3) incidents where supporters of independent candidates were the victims, three (3) incidents involving victims whose affiliation could not be established, two (2) incidents where both PF and independent candidate's supporters were victims, two (2) incidents with police as victims. PAC, both PF and community members, community members and DP were victims in one (1) incident each.
- **Perpetrators:** PF and UPND were the main perpetrators in incidents of politically motivated violence, with PF as the antagonist in more incidents than UPND. The PF members were the main perpetrators with thirty-six (36) incidents since 8 March 2021 with thirty-three (33) of those happening after the 12 May 2021 official campaign period. UPND were main perpetrators in twenty (20) incidents with all happening after 12 May 2021. Interparty clashes between PF and UPND supporters, where a main perpetrator could not be identified or where both parties were equally involved, accounted for sixteen (16) of violent acts since March 8, with thirteen (13) occurring after May 12. Additionally, there were five (5) inter-party incidents where PF supporters clashed, and one (1) intra-party for UPND. Perpetrators with unknown affiliation and a clash between PF and independent candidates were perpetrators in two (2) incidents each while police officers, police and PF supporters, and supporters of an independent candidate were perpetrators in one (1) incident each.

Police Action

CCMG's observers reported that police made arrests in only twenty-three (23) of the eighty-five (85) incidents reported. Furthermore, CCMG's observers reported no known police action in thirty-seven (37) of the eighty-five (85) incidents, and CCMG observers were not able to provide information on police action in the remaining incidents.

Injuries and Deaths

CCMG's observers were able to confirm at least eighty (80) people injured in the eighty-five (85) incidents reported above, as well as two (2) deaths prior to Election Day (See Election Day Deployment and Observation Findings for Election Day incidents).

Most Affected Constituencies

CCMG observers reported violent critical incidents in fifty-one (51) of one hundred and fifty-six (156) constituencies. The top five (5) constituencies with most violent incidents were: seven (7) in Chinsali (Muchinga Province), five (5) in Kanyama (Lusaka Province), four (4) each in Chawama (Lusaka Province), Chililabombwe (Central Province) and Feira (Lusaka Province) and three (3) each in Lukashya (Northern Province), Mongu Central (Western Province), Mumbwa (Central Province) and Ndola Central (Copperbelt Province). The other constituencies where violence was reported had two (2) or one (1) incidents reported.

Politically-Motivated Violence	
Constituency	Number of Incidents of Violence per Constituency
Chinsali	7 incidents
Kanyama	5 incidents
Chawama, Chililabombwe, Feira	4 incidents each
Lukashya, Mongu Central, Mumbwa, Ndola Central	3 incidents each
Chimbamilonga, Kaoma Central, Lukulu East, Mandevu, Mansa Central, Mporokoso, Munali, Nakonde, Bangweulu	2 incidents each
Chavuma, Chilanga, Chimwemwe, Chipata Central, Chisamba, Chitambo, Choma Central, Isoka, Kabushi, Kalulushi, Kaoma, Kapoche, Keembe, Livingstone, Luampa, Lufubu, Malambo, Matero, Mbala, Mpika, Mpulungu, Mufumbwe, Nalolo, Namwala, Nchelenge, Nkana, Nkeyema, Pambashe, Shiwang'andu, Solwezi Central, Wusakile	1 incident each
National Total	85

In addition, there were three (3) violent attacks against media houses and/or journalists, detailed below under Media.

Threats, Intimidation and Harassment

From the beginning of the long-term observation, CCMG observers reported a total of sixty (60) critical incidents which involved threats, intimidation or harassment. Out of these, forty-nine (49) incidents occurred during the official campaign period from 12 May 2021. Most of these incidents were reported in Copperbelt Province and Lusaka Province with twelve (12) incidents each, with most in Copperbelt Province (10) happening during the campaign period while most in Lusaka Province (7) happened prior to the official campaign period.

Threats, Intimidation and Harassment			
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)	Period	All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	3	Central	3
Copperbelt	10	Copperbelt	12
Eastern	3	Eastern	3
Luapula	3	Luapula	4
Lusaka	5	Lusaka	12
Muchinga	6	Muchinga	6
Northern	5	Northern	5
North-Western	3	North-Western	3
Southern	4	Southern	4
Western	7	Western	8
Total	49	Total	60

Threats, Intimidation and Harassment							
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)				All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)			
Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents
PF	24	PF	14	PF	27	PF	16
UPND	13	UPND	9	UPND	14	UPND	10
Community Members	5	Community members	8	PF/UPND	9	PF/UPND	8
PF/UPND	4	VEF Facilitators	7	Community Members	5	Community Members	8
Independent	1	Independent	4	Unknown	2	VEF Facilitators	7
UPND Intra-Party	1	PF/UPND	3	PF Intra-Party	1	Independent	4
Unknown	1	Other parties or candidates	2	UPND Intra-Party	1	Other parties or candidates	2
		Socialist Party	1	Independent	1	Socialist Party	1
		UPND Intra-Party	1			Civil Servant	1
						PF Intra-Party	1
						UPND Intra-Party	1
						Unknown	1

- **Victims:** From the beginning of the long-term observation, PF supporters were victims in sixteen (16) incidents while UPND supporters were victims in ten (10) incidents. Eight (8) incidents involved both PF and UPND. Regrettably, both community members and voter education facilitators (VEF) were victims in eight (8) and in seven (7) incidents, respectively. In addition, independent candidates/their supporters were victims in four (4) incidents, supporters of other parties were victims in two (2) incidents, and a civil servant was a victim in one (1) incident. Both PF and UPND had one (1) intra-party incident each, and CCMG observers reported one (1) incident in which the victim's affiliation could not be established.
- **Perpetrators:** PF supporters were the main perpetrators/participants with twenty-seven (27) incidents reported from the beginning of the pre-election observation by nearly a 2:1 margin over the UPND with fourteen (14) incidents. PF and UPND were both perpetrators in nine (9) incidents, community members in five (5) incidents each with two (2) incidents where affiliation of the perpetrators was not known. PF intraparty, UPND intraparty, and independent candidates were perpetrators in one (1) incident each.

Police Action

CCMG observers reported that the police made arrests in three (3) of the sixty (60) incidents of harassment/threats/intimidation, one each in Luapula, Southern and Western Provinces.

Destruction/Damage of Campaign Material or Property

CCMG observers reported a total of fifty-seven (57) verified critical incidents related to destruction of materials and/or property during its entire pre-election observation with fifty-three (53) of them reported during the official campaign period. Copperbelt Province (18 incidents) and Muchinga Province reported ten (10), the highest numbers of incidents while Northern (1) and North-Western (1) reported the least number of incidents.

Destruction/Damage of Campaign Material or Property			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	6	Central	6
Copperbelt	16	Copperbelt	18
Eastern	6	Eastern	6
Luapula	2	Luapula	3
Lusaka	3	Lusaka	3
Muchinga	9	Muchinga	10
Northern	1	Northern	1
North-Western	1	North-Western	1
Southern	5	Southern	5
Western	4	Western	4
Total	53	Total	57

Destruction/Damage of Campaign Material or Property							
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)				All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)			
Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents
PF	28	UPND	33	PF	31	UPND	36
Unknown	18	PF	8	Unknown	19	PF	9
UPND	4	PF/UPND	6	UPND	4	PF/UPND	6
PF/UPND	3	Independent	5	PF/UPND	3	Independent	5
		Socialist Party	1			Socialist Party	1

- **Victims:** Materials and/or property belonging to UPND supporters were destroyed or damaged in thirty-six (36) incidents during the entire observation period, four times the rate at which those belonging to PF were destroyed or damaged (nine (9) incidents). In six (6) incidents materials for both PF and UPND were damaged or destroyed, in five (5) incidents those belonging to independent candidates and one (1) incident affected the Socialist Party.
- **Perpetrators:** The PF were main perpetrators in thirty-one (31) incidents. In nineteen (19) incidents the damage or destruction was committed by persons of unknown affiliation, in four (4) incidents by UPND supporters and in three (3) incidents by both PF and UPND supporters.

Police Action

CCMG observers reported that the police made arrests in twelve (12) of the fifty-seven (57) incidents of destruction of campaign materials or property, with five (5) arrests in Muchinga Province, three (3) in Copperbelt Province, two (2) in Central province and one (1) each in Southern and Western Provinces.

Arming of Supporters

During the pre-election LTO observation, CCMG observers reported a total of fifteen (15) incidents where supporters were armed with crude weapons (axes, iron bars, machetes, tasers), and some incidents where cadres were in possession of guns with most of the incidents being reported in Lusaka

Province with six (6) incidents, while Luapula, Muchinga and Western Provinces did not report any incidents. Nearly all incidents (fourteen (14) of the fifteen (15) incidents) took place during the official campaign period.

PF supporters were armed in eight (8) incidents and UPND cadres in six (6) incidents, while one (1) incident involved both PF and UPND supporters.

Wearing Military-like Attire			
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)		Period All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Perpetrator	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents
PF	43	PF	51
UPND	21	UPND	24
PF/UPND	1	Socialist Party	2
Independent	1	Independent	1
Socialist Party	1	PF/UPND	1
Unknown	1		

Wearing Military-like Attire

The Penal Code Cap 87 of the laws of Zambia section 182 (1), (2) A, B and (3) prohibits wearing of uniform prescribed for or used by the Defence Force, the Zambia Police Force or any other force or service in Zambia and those who commit this offence are liable to a fine or imprisonment. Furthermore, the use of this attire intimidates community members and other stakeholders.

CCMG long-term observers reported a high number of incidents indicating wearing of military-like attire by party supporters or members while conducting party activities. Since the beginning of pre-election observation in March 2021, CCMG observers reported a total of eighty (80) incidents, sixty-seven (67) of which were reported during the official campaign period. Lusaka Province with nineteen (19) and North-Western Province with fourteen (14) had the highest number of incidents, whereas Muchinga Province had the lowest with two (2) incidents.

A total of fifty-one (51) of these incidents were perpetrated by PF supporters, more than double the number of incidents associated with UPND supporters at twenty-four (24) incidents. Additionally, there were two (2) incidents involving both PF and UPND, and the Socialist Party, and an independent candidate were reported in one instance each with one more instance where the political affiliation could not be determined.

Wearing Military-like Attire				
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)		Period	All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	4	Central	4	
Copperbelt	7	Copperbelt	8	
Eastern	5	Eastern	7	
Luapula	6	Luapula	6	
Lusaka	14	Lusaka	19	
Muchinga	2	Muchinga	2	
Northern	5	Northern	7	
North-Western	12	North-Western	14	
Southern	4	Southern	4	
Western	8	Western	9	
Total	67	Total	80	

Wearing Military-like Attire				
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)		Period	All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Perpetrator	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents	
PF	43	PF	51	
UPND	21	UPND	24	
PF/UPND	1	Socialist Party	2	
Independent	1	Independent	1	
Socialist Party	1	PF/UPND	1	
Unknown	1			

Use of Inflammatory, Defamatory, Vulgar, Offensive or Insulting Language

Since the beginning of the long-term observation on 8 March 2021, CCMG observers reported a total of twenty-five (25) incidents of use of language that was classified as either inflammatory, defamatory, vulgar, offensive or insulting with nineteen (19) of those incidents being reported during the official campaign period. Most of these incidents were reported in the Copperbelt Province.

Use of Inflammatory, Defamatory, Vulgar, Offensive or Insulting Language			
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)		Period	All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)
Central	3	Central	3
Copperbelt	3	Copperbelt	6
Eastern	3	Eastern	3
Luapula	2	Luapula	2
Lusaka	2	Lusaka	4
Muchinga	1	Muchinga	1
Northern	1	Northern	1
North-Western	2	North-Western	2
Southern	0	Southern	0
Western	2	Western	3
Total	19	Total	25

- **Perpetrators:** During the entire observation period, PF supporters were the main perpetrator with seven (7) incidents, UPND supporters in five (5) incidents, four (4) incidents with both PF and UPND supporters, four (4) incidents for PF intra-party and two (2) incidents for UPND intra-party, independent candidates in two (2) incidents while a traditional leader was a perpetrator in one (1) incident.
- **Victims:** During the entire observation period, PF supporters were victims in most (6) of the incidents, followed by PF intra-party incidents with four (4) incidents, two (2) incidents each for UPND and UPND intraparty, three (3) incidents with both PF and UPND, and four (4) each for community members and independent candidates.

Use of Inflammatory, Defamatory, Vulgar, Offensive or Insulting Language							
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)				All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)			
Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents	Perpetrator	Incidents	Victim	Incidents
PF	7	PF	6	PF	7	PF	6
PF intra	0	PF Intra	0	PF intra	4	PF Intra	4
UPND	5	UPND	2	UPND	5	UPND	2
UPND intra	1	UPND Intra	1	UPND intra	2	UPND Intra	2
PF/UPND	3	PF/UPND	2	PF/UPND	4	PF/UPND	3
Independent	2	Independent	4	Independent	2	Independent	4
Traditional Leaders	1	Community Members	4	Traditional Leaders	1	Community Members	4
Total	19	Total	19	Total	25	Total	25

Offences Against Marginalised Groups

CCMG observers reported a total of ten (10) incidents against marginalised communities, all of which occurred during the campaign period. Nine (9) of the incidents were targeted towards women as supporters or candidates with one (1) incident targeting youth participating in electoral processes.

Offences Against Marginalised Groups			
Campaign (12 May to 11 August)	Period	All CCMG (8 March to 11 August)	Pre-Election Observation
Central	0	Central	0
Copperbelt	1	Copperbelt	1
Eastern	3	Eastern	3
Luapula	1	Luapula	1
Lusaka	0	Lusaka	0
Muchinga	1	Muchinga	1
Northern	1	Northern	1
North-Western	3	North-Western	3
Southern	0	Southern	0
Western	0	Western	0
Total	10	Total	10

- **Perpetrators:** PF supporters were the main perpetrators with the highest number of incidents at four (4) incidents (two by cadres and two by MP candidates). Additionally, there were two (2) incidents involving both PF and UPND both by cadres, two (2) involving UPND supporters, and one (1) incident each involving an independent MP candidate and a traditional leader.
- **Victims:** Independent female MP candidates were victims in four (4) of the incidents. PF female candidates were victims in three (3) incidents (2 MP candidates and 1 mayoral), and there were two (2) incidents, one (1) affecting youth and one (1) women supporters, affecting both PF and UPND. In addition, there was one (1) incident where women traders were the victims.

b) Campaign Space

Meeting Prevented/Stopped with COVID-19 Cited

The 12 August 2021 electoral cycle was conducted amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the primary mitigation measure empowering the Ministry of Health to address the crisis, Statutory Instrument (SI) 22 of 2020, had implications for the electoral cycle. SI 22 instituted COVID-19 mitigation measures including mask use, social distancing, handwashing and restrictions on public gatherings, empowering health officials to intervene to bring events into compliance or prevent/shutdown events. Additionally, the ECZ developed and released COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures for elections and electoral processes. A total of twenty-two (22) activities or meetings were prevented or stopped from taking place by authorities, primarily police, citing non-adherence to COVID-19 mitigation measures.

Most of the meetings stopped or prevented were reported in Copperbelt Province with seven (7) incidents while in five (5) provinces (Central, Luapula, Muchinga, and Northern) there were no reports of meetings stopped for COVID-19 reasons.

UPND's activities were prevented at more than six (6) times the rate of PF activities, with nineteen (19) incidents of UPND activities being prevented/stopped by authorities citing COVID-19, compared to only three (3) incidents affecting the PF. Nearly all - twenty-one (21) of the twenty-two (22) meetings - were stopped by the police with no obvious role of health officials, while only one was stopped by officials from the Ministry of Health.

Meeting Prevented/Stopped with COVID-19 Cited				
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All	CCMG	Pre-Election
		Observation	(8	March to 11
		August)		
Central	0	Central	0	
Copperbelt	7	Copperbelt	7	
Eastern	4	Eastern	4	
Luapula	0	Luapula	0	
Lusaka	1	Lusaka	1	
Muchinga	0	Muchinga	0	
Northern	0	Northern	0	
North-Western	0	North-Western	1	
Southern	4	Southern	4	
Western	5	Western	5	
Total	21	Total	22	

Meeting Prevented/Stopped with COVID-19 Cited				
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All	CCMG	Pre-Election
		Observation	(8	March to 11
		August)		
Political Party	Number of Incidents	Political Party	Number	of
			Incidents	
UPND	18	UPND	19	
PF	3	PF	3	

Meetings Prevented/Stopped for Other Reasons

CCMG observers reported a total of fifteen (15) meetings that were prevented or stopped from taking place for other reasons than the COVID-19 mitigation measures, thirteen (13) of which were reported during the campaign period. During the campaign period, activities by UPND were prevented/stopped at a rate four times that of the PF, with eight (8) UPND activities stopped/prevented against only two (2) by the PF. PAC, UNIP and an independent candidate had one (1) meeting each stopped.

Police were involved in preventing or stopping twelve (12) of these meetings. One of the meetings by PF was stopped by a call to the organiser by an unknown person, and PF was involved in stopping two meetings by the UPND. Two (2) meetings were stopped due to non-adherence to the campaign timetables that were set up to avoid clashes between the parties in campaigns, two (2) were stopped with lack of police permission cited as the reason, and one (1) was prevented citing the presence of the Head of State in the area.

Meetings Prevented/Stopped for Other Reasons			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	0	Central	0
Copperbelt	7	Copperbelt	7
Eastern	1	Eastern	1
Luapula	1	Luapula	1
Lusaka	1	Lusaka	2
Muchinga	0	Muchinga	0
Northern	1	Northern	1
North-Western	0	North-Western	0
Southern	2	Southern	3
Western	0	Western	0
Total	13	Total	15

Meetings Prevented/Stopped for Other Reasons			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Political Party	Number of Incidents	Political Party	Number of Incidents
UPND	8	UPND	10
PF	2	PF	2
Independent	1	Independent	1
PAC	1	PAC	1
UNIP	1	UNIP	1

Other Police Actions Limiting Space

CCMG observers also reported two (2) incidents of police limiting campaign space, both of which affected UPND. The two incidents occurred in Copperbelt Province during the campaign period and involved police blocking the movement of UPND convoys with their party president. In one (1) of the incidents, the police blocked the road using police vehicles to prevent the UPND presidential candidate from attending a funeral. In the second incident the police used teargas and fired in the air to prevent the UPND presidential candidate from attending a church service. UPND supporters threw stones at the police in retaliation. In both incidents there were no reports of injuries.

c) Endorsement of Political Parties or Candidates by Traditional or Religious Leaders

i) Religious Leaders

During the campaign period, CCMG observers reported a total of eighteen (18) incidents involving endorsements of political parties and or candidates, including independent candidates, by religious leaders. Such endorsements are against the Electoral Code of Conduct. These endorsements were most prevalent in Copperbelt Province, and PF received the highest number of endorsements, with observers reporting fourteen (14) incidents endorsing PF, and only four (4) endorsing UPND.

Religious Leaders - Political Endorsements	
Province	Religious Leaders Endorsements
Central	4
Copperbelt	6
Eastern	0
Luapula	3
Lusaka	1
Muchinga	1
Northern	2
North-Western	1
Southern	0
Western	0
Total	18

Religious Leaders - Political Endorsements	
Party	Number of Reports
PF	14
UPND	4

ii) Traditional Leaders

There were forty-three (43) reports of endorsements for political parties or candidates, including independents, by traditional leaders (chiefs, sub-chiefs, village headmen/women). Eastern Province had the highest number of reports at nine (9) incidents, followed by Luapula (6) and Southern (6). These endorsements heavily favoured PF, at thirty-three (33) incidents, more than five times the rate of such endorsements for UPND at six (6) incidents. In addition, there were three (3) endorsements for independent candidates and one (1) for a Democratic Party candidate.

Traditional Leaders - Political Endorsements	
Province	Traditional Leaders Endorsements
Central	5
Copperbelt	5
Eastern	9
Luapula	6
Lusaka	0
Muchinga	5
Northern	1
North-Western	5
Southern	6
Western	1
Total	43

Traditional Leaders - Political Endorsements	
Party	Number of Reports
PF	33
UPND	6
Democratic Party	1
Independent	3

d) *Inappropriate Use/Behaviour of Government Resources/Personnel for Political Reasons*

The Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 prohibits the use of government resources for political purposes or political behaviour by civil servants as such actions provide a political party or candidate with an unfair advantage in an electoral process. CCMG observers reported a total of forty (40) instances where government resources were used for political purposes, or where civil servants used their positions in inappropriate political ways. All of these incidents were associated with the PF, with the exception of one for the Socialist Party. The majority of these instances were reported in Eastern Province (17). Among the resources used were: nineteen (19) uses government vehicles for political party activities, fourteen (14) endorsements/political behaviour by government civil servants (district commissioners, teachers, etc.), five (5) instances of prohibited use of government venues for political purposes, and two (2) instances of use of government goods (DMMU food) for political purposes.

Inappropriate Use/Behaviour of Government Resources/Personnel for Political Reasons	
Province	Number
Central	2
Copperbelt	4
Eastern	17
Luapula	4
Lusaka	1
Muchinga	0
Northern	2
North-Western	1
Southern	3
Western	6
National Total	40

Inappropriate Use/Behaviour of Government Resources/Personnel for Political Reasons	
Type	Reports
Government Vehicles	19
Venue	5
Endorsement	14
Government Goods	2

e) *Police Provision of Security for Party Activities*

The Zambia Police Force has a duty to maintain peace and order as prescribed by the Electoral Process Act and the Public Order Act. During the campaign period, according to observer reports, the police provided security to twenty-two percent (22%) of PF activities, eighteen percent (18%) of UPND activities and sixteen percent (16%) of other parties' and/or independent candidates activities. In addition, ten percent (10%) of campaign activities for PF, eleven percent (11%) for UPND and thirteen percent (13%) for other parties/independent activities, were too small to require police presence.

f) *Large Political Party Activities and Government Activities During the Campaign Events Suspension*

- **Political Party Activities:** Observers reported five hundred and seventy-two (572) political party activities attended by more than 50 people despite the suspension of in-person campaign events on 15 June 2021 through the remainder of the campaign period. These activities largely did not follow all COVID-19 mitigation measures, namely use of social distancing, handwashing/sanitising and use of masks.
 - PF conducted three hundred and thirty-two (332) activities with an estimated 50+ participants, where fourteen (14) followed full COVID-19 measures, one hundred and eighty-one (181) followed partial measures and one hundred and thirty-seven (137) had no mitigation measures.
 - UPND conducted one hundred and seventy-four (174) activities with an estimated 50+ participants, where three (3) followed full COVID-19 measures, one hundred (100) followed partial measures followed and seventy-one (71) had no mitigation measures.
 - Other political parties (not PF or UPND) conducted sixty-six (66) activities with an estimated 50+ participants. None of these events followed full COVID-19 measures, thirty (30) had partial measures followed and thirty-six (36) had no mitigation measures.

COVID-19 Measures	Full COVID-19 Mitigation Used <i>Use of social distancing, handwashing/sanitising and masks</i>	Partial COVID-19 Mitigation Used <i>Use of some but not all measures: social distancing, handwashing/sanitising and masks</i>	No COVID-19 Mitigation Used	Total
PF	14	181	137	332
UPND	3	100	71	174
Others	0	30	36	66
Total	17	311	244	572

- **Government Activities:** During the in-person campaign events suspension period, CCMG observers reported forty-two (42) government activities of an estimated 50+ participants. Five (5) of these meetings had full COVID-19 mitigation measures followed, thirty-four (34) had partial measures followed while three (3) had no COVID-19 mitigation measures followed. Twenty-two (22) of these meetings involved launching of development projects by the Head of State, fourteen (14) involved large meetings by government officials (civil servants, teachers DEB meetings) and six (6) involved other activities where government officials were present.

g) Media Harassment, Attacks and Restrictions

CCMG observers reported three attacks on journalists perpetrated by PF supporters. The incidents were reported in Kanyama (Lusaka Province) on 1 May 2021, where two journalists were attacked at the PF secretariat where there was an intra-party confrontation; in Chienge (Luapula Province) on 23 June 2021, where PF supporters were apprehended by community members as they planned an arson attack on Kalungwishi Radio Station; and in Livingstone (Southern Province) on 1 July 2021, where four journalists were attacked and their cameras broken by PF cadres as they (journalists) went to cover the closing of a bar owned by a PF supporter by police.

h) Use of Vehicles Without Number Plates

From the beginning of the long-term observation on 8 March 2021, CCMG observers reported a total of fifty-seven (57) incidents of the use of vehicles without number plates for political activities contrary to Section 82 of the Roads and Road Traffic Act Chapter 464 of the Laws of Zambia, and the Electoral Code of Conduct. Fifteen (15) of these incidents were reported in Lusaka Province, with nine (9) incidents reported in Eastern Province, and eight (8) in Copperbelt Province. North-Western Province did not record any incidents of the use of vehicles without number plates during the observation period. These incidents were primarily related to PF activities.

Use of Vehicles Without Number Plates	
Province	Number
Central	3
Copperbelt	8
Eastern	9
Luapula	3
Lusaka	15
Muchinga	3
Northern	4
North-Western	0
Southern	5
Western	7
National Total	57

i) *Buying/Collection of NRC or Voters Cards Details*

From the beginning of the long-term observation on 8 March 2021, CCMG observers reported a total of fifty-eight (58) incidents where the details or the physical cards of NRCs and/or voters cards were collected, an act prohibited by SI 80 of 2020. Thirty-four (34) of these incidents were reported during the official campaign period.

PF members/supporters were responsible for more than half of the incidents, with thirty-five (35) reports during the entire observation period. In ten (10) incidents the affiliation of the perpetrators could not be identified, UPND members/supporters were responsible in four (4) incidents, both UPND and PF reported responsible in four (4) incidents, independent candidates in three (3) incidents, while a traditional leader and the Leadership Movement (LM) party were reported in one (1) incident each. The issue was particularly prevalent in Copperbelt Province (18), and least common in Central (1) and Eastern (1) Provinces.

In thirty-three (33) incidents, the observers reported that both the NRC and voters' cards were involved. However, in only five (5) incidents, the physical cards were collected from voters, with the majority of incidents (53 incidents) involving only the collection of details/data from both or one of the two identity documents.

Buying/Collection of NRC or Voters Cards Details			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Central	0	Central	1
Copperbelt	9	Copperbelt	18
Eastern	1	Eastern	1
Luapula	3	Luapula	4
Lusaka	2	Lusaka	4
Muchinga	4	Muchinga	5
Northern	3	Northern	4
North-Western	1	North-Western	2
Southern	3	Southern	8
Western	8	Western	11
Total	34	Total	58


Buying/Collection of NRC or Voters Cards Details			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Political Party	Number of Incidents	Political Party	Number of Incidents
PF	25	PF	35
UPND	4	UPND	4
Unknown	2	Unknown	10
PF/UPND	1	PF/UPND	4
Independent	2	Independent	3
		LMP	1
		Traditional Leader	1

Buying/Collection of NRC or Voters Cards Details			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Document	Reports	Document	Reports
NRC Card	0	NRC Card	1
Voters Card	17	Voters Card	24
NRC and Voters Cards	17	NRC and Voters Cards	33
Total	34	Total	58

Buying/Collection of NRC or Voters Cards Details			
Campaign Period (12 May to 11 August)		All CCMG Pre-Election Observation (8 March to 11 August)	
Collected	Number of reports	Collected	Number of Reports
Details	33	Details	53
Card	1	Card	4
Details and Card	0	Details and Card	1
Total	34	Total	58

j) Inducements/Handouts

CCMG observers reported high prevalence of the use of handouts/inducements by political parties, particularly the PF and UPND, throughout the observation period. Both PF and UPND issued handouts in all ten provinces, though UPND's use of handouts varied somewhat throughout the campaign period. Other parties/independent candidates also used handouts but to a lesser extent.



k) *Ferrying of Supporters Outside of the Home Constituency*


From the beginning of the long-term observation, CCMG long-term observers reported a total of forty-five (45) incidents where youth were ferried from outside of their constituencies for political motives. The majority of these incidents were reported in Copperbelt Province (22), with Central and Muchinga Provinces reporting none. The PF was the main perpetrator with thirty (30) cases, UPND was the main perpetrator in twelve (12) cases, while independents were responsible in three (3) incidents. Ferrying of individuals from outside their constituencies risks politically-motivated violence as highlighted in the 2019 report from the Commission of Enquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence, as well as the spread of COVID-19.

Ferrying of Supporters Outside of the Home Constituency	
Province	Number of Incidents
Central	0
Copperbelt	22
Eastern	6
Luapula	1
Lusaka	3
Muchinga	0
Northern	5
North-Western	2
Southern	1
Western	5
National Total	45


l) *Voter Education/Information*

During the long-term observation period, CCMG observers reported on voter education and information by stakeholder and by target audience.

On average over the campaign period, fifty-three percent (53%) of CCMG's observers reported having either witnessed or heard of voter education activities conducted by the ECZ, thirty-five percent (35%) reported voter education activities by the District Voter Education Committees (DVEC), sixteen percent (16%) by civil society organisations (CSOs) or faith-based organisations (FBOs) and forty-two percent (42%) by the local media. Voter education/information by CSOs/FBOs and local media increased throughout the campaign from the beginning of the campaign to the end, while that by ECZ and DVEC increased steadily before dropping close to the election day.



CCMG observers reported low levels of voter education/information targeted at traditionally marginalised groups during the campaign period: twenty-six percent (26%) of CCMG observers reported that the voter education or information targeted youth, twenty-three percent (23%) targeted women and seventeen percent (17%) targeted persons with disabilities.



Election Day Observation – Parallel Vote Tabulation

What is Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT)

The PVT is an internationally recognized methodology used by nonpartisan citizen observer groups to assess the election day processes from setup and opening of polling stations, voting, counting processes and the announcement of official results and therefore verify the accuracy of the official election results as released by the electoral management body.

The PVTs employ the use of carefully trained observers deployed to a random representative sample of polling stations, and use of information communication (ICT) technologies for rapid transmission of observational information. PVTs have been used throughout Africa for the last two decades, including in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and five times in Zambia (1991, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016).


PVTs, when properly done by independent citizen observer groups, reduce uncertainty from the election environment by providing a careful independent analysis of the electoral process. Where PVTs expose fraud, or identify problems in the process, they provide an objective basis for understanding the negative effects or for seeking peaceful resolution of complaints. PVTs, thus, reduce the potential for political conflict.

PVTs serve to independently verify official election results by comparing the official result with the PVT's estimated range for each candidate (as well as for rejected candidates and turnout). If the official result falls within the PVT estimated range, then the official result reflects the ballots cast at polling stations. However, if the official result falls outside of the PVT estimated range, then the official result has been manipulated and the PVT suggests the true result.

How is the PVT different from other observation methodologies

i) Use of Statistics - a PVT observation deploys observers to a nationally representative sample of polling stations and hence the data that they collect can be used to systematically assess the quality of the whole election day processes and formulate an accurate projection of the election's results on a national scale.

ii) Uses Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) - Utilizes ICTs to transmit observer reports directly into a computer database using SMS in near real time.



What PVT is Not

Though a PVT is a trusted and reliable election day observational methodology, they also have their own limitations such as:

Only evaluates the election day processes. The PVT can only evaluate the election processes on the election day. They cannot be used to evaluate the pre-election period. They cannot tell if there were major problems during the pre-election period such as instances of violence on political activities, incidents of hate speech among others.

A PVT cannot tell a voter's motivation for voting. Since the observers do not interact with the voters asking for their opinions or how they voted, the PVT cannot tell what motivated a voter to get out and vote.

A PVT can only evaluate information collected by standardized PVT forms. PVTs does not collect anecdotal information. They evaluate the election day processes using standardized forms that are completed by highly trained and skilled observers.

CCMG's PVT Deployment Methodology

CCMG's PVT deployed carefully recruited, trained and deployed accredited independent 1,500 non-partisan monitors and 181 roving constituency supervisors to a nationally representative random sample

of 1,500 polling stations with 866,689 registered voters of whom 463,625 were women (53.5%).

The PVT sample was carefully developed by CCMG's trained statistician, according to established statistical principles to ensure that it was nationally representative and included polling stations in every province, district and constituency in the country. This was done by using stratification by province, district and constituency to ensure the percentage of polling stations, number of registered voters and number female registered voters in the sample closely matched the percentage for the entire country. For example, Eastern Province had 11.8% of all polling stations nationally, 12.8% of all registered voters, and 13.1% of all female registered voters in the country, and so the CCMG's PVT sample matched this distribution with 11.8% of polling stations, 12.8% of registered voters, and 13.3% female registered voters coming for Eastern Province in the sample.

This ensured that CCMG's PVT sample was truly nationally representative and therefore, could determine the quality of the voting and counting processes and hence accurately estimate how Zambians cast their ballots in all 12,152 polling stations.

On election day, CCMG's PVT monitors witnessed and reported on the entire voting and counting process, arriving at 5:30 in the morning and staying at their assigned polling station until counting was completed and results for the presidential polls were posted.

CCMG's PVT monitors also do not count the presidential ballots as that is the responsibility of the polling officials. However, our monitors are present throughout the counting process and report on its conduct. CCMG's PVT estimates, therefore, are based on the official and publicly available official results from polling stations. PVTs are used around the world and across Africa to independently determine if official election results reflect the ballots cast.

PVTs in Zambia have verified results in past elections both when the ruling party candidate won the election as well as when an opposition party candidate prevailed. For example, the PVT verified the results of the 2008 presidential election when the late Michael Sata lost as well as confirmed his victory in 2011.

PVT Reporting and the CCMG Data Centre


Throughout the election day, each PVT monitor at their assigned sampled polling station sent in coded text messages with data related to their observation of the 2021 presidential election.

Coded text messages sent by CCMG PVT Monitors provided detailed information on the conduct of the voting process as well as the official presidential results for the stations as announced by the poll officials. To receive and process the large amount of data from the deployed monitors, CCMG established a data center in Lusaka. Forty-four Data Clerks, working in shifts, were recruited and trained on the reporting systems and on following up with the observers where more information was needed. The data clerks were assisted by the ten CCMG Provincial Coordinators.




Women and Youth Participation in PVT

CCMG, together with other election observation groups worldwide, supports universal and equal suffrage, and is guided by human rights principles against discrimination. The participation of women, youth and other traditionally marginalised populations is imperative for inclusive, equitable and sustainable electoral processes. Throughout the PVT project, CCMG took steps to collect data on issues of participation of traditionally marginalised groups, and took strategic steps from a management perspective and ensured that women and youth were represented and participated in the project. In aggregate, 50% of the PVT monitors were women and 86% of all monitors were youth (18 - 35 years). Additionally, 45% of the PVT Supervisors were women and 69% of all PVT Supervisors were youth (18 - 35 years).





Distribution of PVT Supervisors by Gender and Age



Election Day Deployment

PVT Observation Findings



On Election Day, CCMG deployed 1,500 highly trained accredited independent non-partisan parallel vote tabulation (PVT) Monitors to a nationally representative random sample of 1,500 polling stations. In addition, 181 Constituency Supervisors deployed to support the PVT Monitors and serve as mobile monitors, and additional Long-Term Observers (LTOs) also observed throughout their assigned constituencies. CCMG's PVT focused on the collection of structured data via SMS from CCMG's PVT Monitors observing throughout the day, as well as critical incident reports sent by its PVT Monitors, Constituency Supervisors and Long-Term Observers.


Key Findings

Set-Up and Opening of Polling Stations


The set-up and opening of polling stations across the country largely adhered to procedures:

- Polling stations opened on time with 97% open by 06h30 across the country






- At less than 1% of polling stations observers reported materials missing during setup; and
- At over 99% of polling stations the presidential ballot box was shown to be empty before being closed and sealed.



Voting

- At over 99% of polling stations the basic voting procedures were adhered to:



- At 99% of polling stations voters' fingers being checked for indelible ink;
- At 99% of polling stations voters were required to show their NRC and Voter ID card;
- At over 99% of polling stations officials checked for voters' names in the voters register;
- At over 99% of polling stations officials stamped the presidential ballot paper before issuing it to voters; and
- At 99% of polling stations voters' fingers were marked with indelible ink.

However, there were reports of polling stations running out of ink for the official stamp as well as indelible ink that may have delayed the voting process.

In addition:


- At 3% of polling stations, voting was suspended at some point during the day;
- At 97% of polling stations, no one voted who appeared not to be eligible;



- At 2% of polling stations, CCMG Monitors reported that a few (less than five people) individuals were allowed to vote, even though they did not have both an NRC and voter ID card or already had indelible ink on their fingers or their names were not on the voters register; and
- At 6% of polling stations, the setup of the polling station allowed polling officials and/or party agents to see how voters marked their ballots.

Voter Verification Devices (VVDs)

Despite requests, the ECZ did not provide information to CCMG regarding the deployment and use of the VVDs and their late introduction prior to the polling day largely raised confusion and concern on their use. Based on what CCMG was able to observe of their use, VVDs were used at approximately 13% of polling stations with the devices most common in Lusaka and Western provinces.




Closing

Polling stations were scheduled to close by 18h00, with all voters in the queue at 18h00 allowed to proceed to present their required documents for voting.

In addition:

- At 97% of polling stations voters in the queue at 18h00 were given an opportunity to vote; and
- While 45% of polling stations were closed by 18h00 and a further 47% closed by 20h00, 9% of polling stations closed after 20h00. Polling stations closed particularly late in Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces, where 19% and 17% respectively closed after 20h00.




Province	Closed 18h00	by	Closed 20h00	by	Closed after 20h00
Central	48%		49%		3%
Copperbelt	28%		56%		17%
Eastern	49%		49%		3%
Luapula	61%		35%		4%
Lusaka	28%		53%		19%
Muchinga	45%		50%		5%
Northern	56%		41%		3%
North-Western	57%		34%		9%
Southern	41%		47%		13%
Western	53%		43%		4%
National	45%		47%		9%

Counting


Counting procedures were largely adhered to, including:

- PF party agents were present for the counting of ballot papers at 98% of polling stations while UPND party agents at 99% of polling stations;




Province	PF Agent Present at Counting	UPND Agent Present at Counting
Central	97%	98%
Copperbelt	99%	99%
Eastern	100%	99%
Luapula	100%	99%
Lusaka	100%	99%
Muchinga	100%	100%
Northern	98%	97%
North-Western	96%	100%
Southern	94%	100%
Western	99%	99%
National	98%	99%

- Ballot papers were counted at the polling station 98% of the time;
- At 10% of polling stations there was insufficient light during counting, making counting the ballots more challenging;
- At 90% of polling stations the presidential ballot papers were sorted into individual piles by candidate;
- At 98% of polling stations the presidential ballot papers were shown to all party agents and monitors present so they could see how each ballot paper was marked.



- At 97% of polling stations, all of the presidential ballot papers were counted according to ECZ procedures.
- At 99% of polling stations a PF agent signed and in 99% a UPND agent signed polling station results form GEN 20.




- At less than 1% of polling stations did a PF or UPND party agent disagree with the presidential results.

Violence and Harassment


There were multiple acts of violence on Election Day. It was widely reported that the PF chairperson for North-Western province was killed and the former Mayor of Lusaka from PF was stabbed. These acts are to be condemned in the strongest terms. For these incidents and other detailed descriptions, refer to Section vi. Election Day Critical Incidents.

Incidents of harassment or intimidation were reported at 2% of polling stations, while incidents of violence at 3% of polling stations during voting and counting.




Accessibility and Inclusion


- Approximately half of all polling officials were women



- At 39% of polling stations there was a female security officer present
- At 43% of PF and 37% of UPND party agents were women
- At 48% of polling stations voters had to climb stairs to reach the polling station limiting access to the physically impaired. This issue affected at least 60% of all polling stations in North-Western, Central and Luapula.



- Only 44% of polling stations had braille jackets to assist the visually impaired. In Luapula, Lusaka and Muchinga, at least half of all polling stations did not have braille jackets.



In addition:


- At 96% of polling stations persons with disabilities, pregnant women, nursing mothers and the elderly were allowed to go to the front of the queue;
- At 6% of polling stations someone other than a polling official assisted multiple people to vote; and
- At 6% of polling stations men voted on behalf of able-bodied women.

COVID-19


CCMG notes that the ECZ published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for electoral processes under COVID in June 2021, outlining various mitigation measures at polling stations.

CCMG's Monitors observed and reported on compliance with the mitigations in the SOPs as follows:

- At 95% of polling stations there were hand washing or sanitising facilities;
- At 99% of polling stations polling officials were wearing masks;



- Social distancing was only maintained in the set-up of 87% of polling stations;
- At only 14% of polling stations were voters' temperatures taken upon entering the polling station



- At 85% of polling stations no one was turned away due to COVID-19 mitigation measures, but at 12% of polling stations a few potential voters (one to five) were not permitted to vote due to failure to adhere to COVID-19 mitigation.

Election Day Critical Incidents

CCMG's Monitors reported a total of eighty-two (82) confirmed election day critical incidents, seventeen (17) of which were related to violence at polling stations, with three (3) incidents resulting in death or injury. In addition, CCMG Monitors reported three (3) incidents of harassment/intimidation/threats, seven (7) incidents of monitors/party agents not permitted to observe, ten (10) incidents of missing voting materials, eight (8) incidents of voting suspended or delayed, ten (10) incidents where results were not posted publicly, three (3) incidents of able bodied people being assisted to vote, three (3) incidents where secrecy of the ballot was not maintained, one (1) incident where one person assisted multiple people to vote, three (3) incidents of illegal voting, three (3) incidents where eligible voters were not permitted to vote, eight (8) incidents of disorder in the voting queue and five (5) miscellaneous incidents. Lusaka and Southern provinces had the highest number of reported incidents, with eighteen (18) and fifteen (15) respectively, followed by Copperbelt (13), Eastern (11), Western (9), North-Western (6), Central (6), Northern (4) and no incidents in Muchinga or Luapula.

CCMG notes that many of these incidents were linked to several issues that emerged on election day, namely suspicion of people bringing ballot papers into polling stations, insufficient provision of GEN 20 forms and stamps/ink, and long waits both in the queue and for the announcement of results. In 2016, CCMG received a total of 74 confirmed critical incident reports, slightly lower than in 2021; however, CCMG received more reports of violence at polling stations and fewer incidents of harassment/intimidation/threats than in 2016.

i. Violence at Polling Stations (17 incidents)

CCMG Monitors reported a total of seventeen (17) incidents of violence inside and outside the polling station on election day, as detailed below. Several of these incidents involved suspicion of individuals carrying ballot papers into polling stations, resulting in one (1) death and injuries. Tensions among supporters related to the counting process also contributed to three (3) incidents.

Central Province (1 incident)

- Katuba Constituency (1 incident): There was an incident of violence at Shifwankula Primary School when party agents and voters accused the polling officials of bringing illegal documents to the polling station and threw stones at the polling station. Police and security officers were deployed to control the situation.

Copperbelt Province (3 incidents)

- Kitwe Constituency (1 incident): A group of PF and UPND supporters at Minsenga Primary School tried to forcefully enter the polling station because they believed the ballots were not being counted correctly. Police intervened and stopped the supporters from entering the polling station.
- Chingola Constituency (1 incident): A group of unidentified party supporters at Chiti Mukulu Hall tried to forcefully enter the polling station because they believed the ballots were not being counted correctly. Police intervened and dispersed the supporters.
- Nkana Constituency (1 incident): At Kamakonde Primary School, unidentified party supporters threw stones at the polling station because of the slow counting of votes. Security officers and soldiers arrived to restore order.

Lusaka Province (6 incidents)

- Chawama Constituency (1 incident): During a disagreement between PF and UPND supporters at Freedom Water Trust/JICA building polling station, a PF supporter shot and injured a UPND supporter. Police officers and military police arrived to investigate, and the PF supporter handed himself to the police.
- Kabwata Constituency (1 incident): A PF agent was beaten by unknown people at Arthur Wina Primary School on suspicion that he was carrying ballot papers. The PF agent was rescued by police officers. No injuries or arrests were reported.
- Kanyama Constituency (4 incidents): At one polling station (Chibolya Primary School), voters attempted to enter the polling station when they felt that the Presiding Officer was delaying the counting process. Police officers were called and the perpetrators were taken away. At another polling station (Mukwas Primary School), unknown people in a private vehicle attempted to force their way into the polling station and were beaten and had stones thrown at their vehicle by voters. At the same location (Mukwas Primary School), unknown people threw stones at the polling station for unknown reasons. The police intervened to stop the violence with no injuries reported. At Cylde Anderson Community School, an ECZ vehicle that brought a Biometric Voter Verification Device to the polling station was stoned by voters who assumed that the vehicle was carrying pre-marked ballot papers. Military police intervened.

Northern Province (1 incident)

- Mporokoso Constituency (1 incident): UPND supporters at Bulangililo Hall tried to force their way into the polling station to witness the counting process. The Police intervened and dispersed the supporters.

North-Western Province (2 incidents)

- Solwezi Central Constituency (1 incident): North-Western PF Provincial Chairperson was beaten to death by suspected UPND supporters at Kyawama Secondary School. The Chairperson had been accused of attempting to bring pre-marked ballot papers into the polling station.
- Chavuma Constituency (1 incident): ECZ officials who were transporting fuel along the Zambezi River were blocked and beaten by UPND supporters on suspicion of carrying stamped ballots. No injuries or arrests were reported.

Southern Province (3 incidents)

- Choma Constituency (1 incident): Stones were thrown at Kamunza Primary School polling station by unknown people after they suspected a monitor sponsored by Good Governance Zambia of having electoral materials in his bag. A search conducted by the security officer did not find suspicious materials.
- Monze Central Constituency (2 incidents): There were two (2) reports of violence at two different polling stations in the constituency. In the first instance, a party agent from an unidentified party arrived to observe the election process at Monze Primary School and was manhandled and stopped by voters standing in the queue. In the second instance, a suspected female PF member was chased and beaten by a mob outside the Home Craft Trades Centre polling station. The PF member was suspected to have pre-marked ballot papers in her possession. A police officer intervened and arranged for the injured woman to be taken to a clinic.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Mitete Constituency (1 incident): A voter was beaten by a PF supporter at Kashizhi Primary School for unknown reasons. No injuries or arrests were reported.

ii. Harassment, Intimidation or Threats Inside and Outside Polling Stations (3 incidents)

On election day, CCMG Monitors reported three (3) incidents of harassment, intimidation or threats involving CCMG Monitors and ECZ officials as the victims, as detailed below:

Copperbelt Province (1 incident)

- Kabushi Constituency (1 incident): A CCMG Monitor was harassed and intimidated by supporters of an unknown party when she momentarily stepped out of Toka Community Hall polling station. The party supporters suspected that the monitor had ballot papers in her possession. The police were called to control the situation.

North-Western Province (2 incidents)

- Solwezi West Constituency (1 incident): An ECZ official at Kalumbila Primary School was harassed by voters for trying to pass the official stamp out of the polling station through a window.
- Solwezi Central Constituency (1 incident): At Kyawama Secondary School, a CCMG Supervisor was harassed by a group of voters when she went to check on one of her monitors at her assigned polling station. Police officers were called to disperse the voters.

iii. Monitor or Party Agent Not Permitted to Observe (7 incidents)

CCMG received a total of seven (7) incidents of monitors/observers not permitted to observe on election day, with two (2) incidents related to ECZ officials requiring additional documents not required per the ECZ's accreditation procedures. All incidents are detailed as follows:

Central Province (1 incident)

- Chisamba Constituency (1 incident): A CCMG Monitor at Mupelekese Primary School was initially not allowed to observe at his polling station, despite presenting his accreditation card. The ECZ officials required an accreditation letter in addition to the accreditation card. The Monitor was, however,

eventually allowed to observe just before voting began.

Copperbelt Province (2 incidents)

- Mpongwe Constituency (1 incident): A CCMG Monitor at Bilima Primary School was initially not allowed to observe by the Presiding Officer, despite presenting their accreditation card. The Presiding Officer requested an accreditation letter issued by the ECZ. However, after intervention by the CCMG Secretariat, the monitor was allowed to observe.
- Wusakile Constituency (1 incident): Party agents at Kalela Primary School were not allowed to observe from inside the polling station because the maximum number of monitors allowed had been attained.

Eastern Province (1 incident)

- Malambo Constituency (1 incident): A PF agent at St. Luke's Secondary School was stopped from observing by the security officer when the UPND agents insisted he be disqualified for bringing party-branded materials into the polling station.

Southern Province (1 incident)

- Choma Constituency (1 incident): A CCMG Monitor at Nkumbulu Health Post was initially not allowed to observe because the polling station was filled with monitors from other organizations and had reached the maximum number of people allowed per COVID-19 guidelines. The Monitor was ultimately allowed to observe.

Western Province (2 incidents)

- Kaoma Constituency (1 incident): A party agent from an unidentified party at Nyango Correctional Facility was not allowed to observe because he did not have an ECZ accreditation letter/accreditation card.
- Nkeyema Constituency (1 incident): PF agents were not allowed to observe the voting process at Namamono Primary School by UPND agents because they were from a different community.

iv. Missing or Wrong Election Materials (10 incidents)

On election day, CCMG Monitors reported ten (10) incidents of missing or wrong election materials at polling stations across the country, the majority of which were related to insufficient ink for the official stamp:

Central Province (1 incident)

- Mumbwa Constituency (1 incident): A Monitor reported that the official stamp at Welfare Hall polling station had insufficient ink.

Copperbelt Province (3 incidents)

- Kafulafuta Constituency (2 incidents): At Silangwa Secondary School, the official stamp ran out of ink, and at Chief Chiwala's Camp polling station, various election materials were missing as the ECZ vehicle delivering election materials had a tire puncture, delaying the opening of the polling station. The materials eventually arrived and the polling station opened just after 09:00 hours.
- Bwana Mkubwa Constituency (1 incident): A Monitor reported that the official stamp ran out of ink at Ndeke Primary School.

Lusaka Province (4 incidents)

- Chawama Constituency (1 incident): At Freedom Water Trust/JICA building, the official stamp was reported to have run out of ink.
- Kabwata Constituency (1 incident): At St. Patrick's Primary School, the official stamp was reported to have run out of ink.
- Kanyama Constituency (2 incidents): At Psalms UCZ Church and at Kanyama West Clinic Area, the official stamp was reported to have run out of ink.

Southern Province (1 incident)

- Chikankata Constituency (1 incident): Kooma New Apostolic Church had the wrong stamp and the indelible ink was faint and a replacement stamp had to be brought.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Sioma Constituency (1 incident): The indelible ink was reported to have become faint at Sioma Primary School.

v. Voting Delayed or Suspended (8 incidents)

Due to the missing, incorrect or delayed election materials-related incidents noted above, voting was delayed or suspended in Copperbelt Province (2 incidents – Kafulafuta and Bwana Mkumbwa constituencies), Lusaka Province (3 incidents - Chawama, Kabwata and Kanyama constituencies), Southern Province (1 incident – Chikankata constituency), and Western Province (1 incident – Sioma constituency). There was also one (1) incident reported in Northern Province (Kaputa constituency) where voting was suspended for a few minutes when voters complained that people with disabilities (PWDs) were not allowed to go to the front of the queue to vote.

vi. Results Not Posted at Polling Station (10 incidents)

CCMG Monitors reported a total of ten (10) incidents of the official ECZ results (GEN 20 Form) not being posted outside the polling station for the public to see, with the majority of these reports due to the ECZ not providing the GEN 20 form for posting:

Copperbelt Province (1 incident)

- Ndola Central Constituency (1 incident): At Provost polling station, no reason was provided by the Presiding Officer for not posting the results.

Lusaka Province (5 incidents)

- Lusaka Central Constituency (1 incident): At Kabulonga Boys Secondary School, the results were not posted because the polling station was not provided with supplies by ECZ to post the GEN 20 forms outside the polling station.
- Kanyama Constituency (1 incident): At New Kanyama Primary School, the results were not posted because the polling station was not provided with supplies by ECZ to post the GEN 20 forms outside the polling station.
- Mandevu Constituency (1 incident): At Ngombe Primary School, the results were not posted because the polling station was not provided with supplies by ECZ to post the GEN 20 forms outside the polling station.
- Mandevu Constituency (1 incident): At Ngombe PTA School, the results were not posted because the Presiding Officer said he was too tired to post them.
- Kanyama Constituency (1 incident): At Chinika Secondary School, the results were not posted by the Presiding Officer for unknown reasons.

Northern Province (1 incident)

- Mpulungu Constituency (1 incident): At Chintinta Primary School, the results were not posted because the polling staff were not provided with supplies by ECZ to post the GEN 20 forms outside the polling station. A copy of the GEN 20 form was instead given to each party agent and the monitors/observers present.

Southern Province (2 incidents)

- Choma Constituency (1 incident): At Choma Day High School, the results were not posted because the GEN 20 forms had not been provided by ECZ.
- Katombola Constituency (1 incident): At Siamango Secondary School, the results were not posted for unknown reasons.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Senanga Constituency (1 incident): At Namalangu Secondary School, the results were not posted because the polling officials had not been provided with supplies by ECZ to post the GEN 20 forms outside the polling station.

vii. Able Bodied (People Without Disabilities) People Assisted to Vote (3 incidents)

CCMG Monitors reported three (3) incidents of able-bodied (non-disabled) people being assisted to vote by the Presiding Officer or other polling officials:

Northern Province (1 incident)

- Chilubi Constituency (1 incident): Several able-bodied people were assisted to vote by the polling staff at Mayuka Primary School.

Southern Province (1 incident)

- Choma Central Constituency (1 incident): There was a report of thirteen (13) able bodied people being assisted to vote at Masopo Primary School by their relatives with the permission of the Presiding Officer.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Sioma Masopo Primary School (1 incident): The Presiding Officer at Kang'unung'unu Community School assisted a few elderly people to mark their ballot papers and cast their votes.

viii. Polling Officials/Party Agents Able to See How Voters Marked their Ballot Papers (3 incidents)

There were three (3) incidents reported of polling officials/party agents being able to see how voters marked their ballot papers:

Central Province (1 incident)

- Bwacha Constituency (1 incident): Some voters at Nkwashi Primary School were marking their ballot papers outside the booth despite being guided by polling officials/ushers to use the booth.

ix. One Person Assisting Multiple People to Vote (other than polling officials) (1 incident)

There was one report of multiple people being assisted to vote by a person other than polling officials. In Chipata Central (Eastern Province), a suspected PF member was reported to have helped multiple people to vote by telling them who to vote for and how to mark their ballot papers.

x. Illegal Voting (Voting Without NRC/Voter ID, etc.) (3 incidents)

CCMG received three (3) reports of illegal voting (i.e. voting without an original NRC/Voter ID, etc):

Southern Province (3 incidents)

- Monze Central Constituency (2 incidents): There were two reports received from one polling station (Kazungula Primary School). One voter was allowed to vote despite their name not appearing in the voters' register and another voter was allowed to vote even though his name did not appear in the voters' register, however his voter's card indicated the correct polling station name.

- Livingstone Constituency (1 incident): At Palm Grove Basic School, a voter was allowed to vote using a digital copy of their NRC because they forgot their original NRC at home.

xi. Eligible Voters Not Permitted to Vote (3 incidents)

CCMG received three (3) reports of eligible voters not permitted to vote:

Lusaka Province (2 incidents)

- Kanyama Constituency (1 incident): At New Kanyama Primary School, four (4) voters were not permitted to vote because the details on their NRCs were not clear/visible.
- Munali Constituency (1 incident): A voter at Kaunda Square Primary School was not permitted to vote because their name was appearing twice in the voters' register.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Senanga Constituency (1 incident): A voter registered at Maziba Primary School was not permitted to vote because their details did not appear in the voters' register.

xii. Disorder in the Queue Outside of Polling Station (8 incidents)

CCMG received a total of eight (8) reports of disorder in the queue outside of the polling station during voting:

Central Province (2 incidents)

- Katuba Constituency (1 incident): At Shifwankula Primary School, a voter skipped the line and went to the front of the queue which caused disorder among the other voters.
- Itezhi-Tezhi Constituency (1 incident): A drunk voter at Itezhi-Tezhi Primary School caused disorder when he refused to follow the queue.

Lusaka Province (2 incidents)

- Mandevu Constituency (1 incident): There was disorder in the queue at Mandevu Community Centre when the security officers left briefly.
- Kanyama Constituency (1 incident): Some voters outside Mukwas Primary School polling station threw stones at the polling station causing other voters in the queue to disperse. Soldiers intervened to restore order. The incident is detailed in the violence section above.

Southern Province (1 incident)

- Monze Central Constituency (1 incident): At Kazungula Primary School, party members of an unidentified party dropped bags of mealie meal at the polling station to cause confusion and disrupt the voting process. Police officers intervened and took the party members away.

Copperbelt Province (2 incidents)

- Roan Constituency (1 incident): There was disorder in the queue at Section 25 Clinic when an independent party candidate arrived at the polling station. The voters questioned his presence as there were no other party candidates present.
- Chingola Constituency (1 incident): At Restored Community School polling station, there was disorder in the queue when voters who had queued up before voting began did not want elderly people to be given a chance to go to the front of the queue and vote first. The situation normalised after the Presiding Officer intervened.

Western Province (1 incident)

- Sioma Constituency (1 incident): Voters from Sioma Primary School area threatened violence because they believed the counting process was too slow. Others joined in in support and that caused commotion outside the polling station.

xiii. Incorrectly Following Procedures (1 incident)

There was a report that an ECZ official in Chililabombwe (Copperbelt Province) who was assisting voters to drop their marked ballot papers in the ballot boxes was dropping them in incorrect ballot boxes.

xiv. Miscellaneous (5 incidents)

Lusaka Province (1 incident)

- Mandevu Constituency (1 incident): At Ng'ombe PTA School, a voter was misinformed about the voting process by a UPND agent present who posed as a polling official, and when she returned to vote, she was not permitted to vote because voting had ended.

North-Western Province (2 incidents)

- Zambezi East Constituency (2 incidents): In the first incident, a voter at Zambezi Basic School was found with pre-marked ballot papers and was apprehended by the security officers, and in the second incident, a party agent from an unidentified political party came to Nyamong'a Leprosarium polling station with a voters' register that was already signed before voting had begun. The register was taken away from him by the Presiding Officer.

Southern Province (1 incident)

Livingstone Constituency (1 incident): At Mukamusamba School, there was a report of a party agent from an unidentified political party who allegedly tried to tamper with counted ballot papers that had fallen out of their pile during the counting process.

Southern Province (1 incident)

Choma Central Constituency (1 incident): Polling officials at Masopo Primary School accidentally tore a valid ballot paper which was then marked as 'spoilt' and set aside.

Appeals and Complaints Process

Disputes that arise from the conduct of elections are settled through an election petition to be filled by the aggrieved. The election petition process is guided by the Constitution of Zambia and the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016. The election tribunal or courts of law preside over election petitions depending on what the law provides or jurisdiction. According to article 101 (4) of the constitution, a person may within seven days of the declaration made under clause (2), petition the constitutional court to nullify the election of the presidential candidate who took part in the initial ballot on the grounds that - (a) the person was not validly elected; or (b) a provision of this Constitution or other law relating to presidential elections was not complied with. The Constitutional Court shall hear an election petition filed in accordance with clause (4) within fourteen days of the filing of the petition. The Constitutional Court may, after hearing an election petition - (a) declare the election of the presidential candidate valid; (b) nullify the election of the presidential candidate; or (c) disqualify the presidential candidate from being a candidate in the second ballot. A decision of the Constitutional Court made in accordance with clause (6) is final.

On 16 August, 2021, the Electoral Commission of Zambia declared Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) as winner of the Presidential Election. Within seven (7) days of the date of announcement of the Presidential Election, there was no petition filed to challenge the validity of the Presidential election results. However, disputes arose from some National Assembly results and local Government Election results. Petitions of the 2021 Results and their status can be tracked with the Electoral Disputes Resolution (EDR) Tracker.⁵

Seats	Number of Petitions
Presidential	0
Member of National Assembly	83
Local Government	233
Mayoral/Council Chairperson	36
Total Petitions	352

Analysis of Polling Station Level Results Data Available on ECZ Website

As with elections in 2016, the ECZ posted polling station level election results for the presidential election (as well as for parliamentary and local government elections) on its website (<https://zambiaelections2021.org.zm/>). The ECZ improved its posting of presidential results in 2021 by posting all presidential polling station level results for a constituency on a single webpage rather than posting them on individual webpages for each polling station as had previously been the practice. This makes it easier for stakeholders to check results for individual polling stations.

However, the ECZ's results posting practice continues to fall short of best practices for transparency and accountability as documented in the Open Election Data Initiative (<https://openelectiondata.net/>), which calls for all results to be available in a single downloadable file in a machine-readable format (such as Excel or CSV). While posting individual polling station level results (either on their own individual webpage or by constituency) is valuable and allows stakeholders to confirm individual results one by one, it does not allow them to add those results together for themselves to independently verify the accuracy

⁵See SEDROBZ Electoral Dispute Tracker (EDR): <https://www.sedrobz.org/edr-tracker/index>.

of the overall results (i.e., that the overall results are indeed the sum of the individual polling station level results).

While the ECZ website also provided registered voters per constituency, it did not provide this information per individual polling station making it impossible to identify anomalies in turnout without consulting the ECZ's list of polling stations (which was provided in PDF, but not Excel or CSV format again making use by stakeholders more challenging). Further, polling stations names are not unique on their own. They are only unique when combined with their polling district. However, the ECZ website does not provide polling district names for polling stations.

Since the ECZ does not make presidential polling station level results available in a single downloadable file in a machine-readable format, CCMG employed data analysts to copy (or scrape) the presidential polling station level results from the ECZ website using special software. This exercise revealed results for 11,607 polling stations were posted on the ECZ's website. However, results for 545 polling stations (4.5%) of the 12,152 polling stations were not posted. As Table 1 shows, the largest number of missing presidential polling station level results were for Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces which were missing 234 or 13.6% and 280 or 17.5% of polling stations respectively.

Province	Number of Polling Stations from ECZ List of Polling Stations	Number of Polling Stations with Presidential Results on ECZ Website	Difference
Central	1,143	1,135	8
Copperbelt	1,719	1,485	234
Eastern	1,437	1,433	4
Luapula	1,017	1,016	1
Lusaka	1,602	1,322	280
Muchinga	793	791	2
Northern	1,103	1,101	2
North-Western	794	794	0
Southern	1,394	1,382	12
Western	1,150	1,148	2
Total	12,152	11,607	545

There are 907 polling stations on the ECZ list of polling stations with identical names that are in the same constituency. As was the case with the ECZ website in 2016, for polling stations with identical names in the same constituency the ECZ website only lists one of these polling stations rather than all of them. For example, according to ECZ's list of polling stations in Chawama constituency in Lusaka province there are four polling stations with the name "Twatasha Primary School-01" (each with a different polling district). However, on ECZ website there are presidential results for only one polling station named "Twatasha Primary School-01." Because the ECZ website does not include either the number of registered voters or the polling district it is not possible to determine which of the four polling stations with the name "Twatasha Primary School-01" was loaded on the website and which are missing. This problem disproportionately affects Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces which both have large numbers of polling stations at the same school or other polling location. Thus, the 545 missing polling

stations are technically polling stations with duplicate names whose data was not loaded on the ECZ website.

Table 2 compares the sum of the presidential results for the 11,607 polling stations on the ECZ website. While the figures and percentages are slightly different due to missing results for polling stations with the same name, the overall trend is the same.

Table 2: Comparison of ECZ Website Overall Presidential Results with Sum of Presidential Polling Station Level Results					
Candidate	Party	ECZ Website Overall Presidential Results		ECZ Website Sum of Presidential Polling Station Level Results	
		Votes	% Vote	Votes	% Votes
BANDA Andyford	PAC	19,937	0.41%	19,622	0.43%
CHANDA Charles	UPPZ	6,543	0.14%	6,346	0.14%
CHISELA Lazarus	ZUSD	5,253	0.11%	5,201	0.11%
HAMUDUDU Highvie	PNUP	10,480	0.22%	9,915	0.22%
HICHILEMA Hakainde	UPND	2,852,348	59.02%	2,719,833	59.53%
KALABA Harry	DP	25,231	0.52%	24,324	0.53%
KATEKA Chishala	NHP	8,169	0.17%	7,908	0.17%
LUNGU Edgar	PF	1,870,780	38.71%	1,742,865	38.15%
M'MEMBE Fred	SP	16,644	0.34%	15,967	0.35%
MUMBA Nevers	MMD	4,968	0.10%	4,660	0.10%
MWAMBA Musonda	UNIP	3,036	0.06%	2,928	0.06%
MWENDA Kasonde	EFF	1,345	0.03%	1,308	0.03%
NYIRENDA Stephen	NAREP	1,808	0.04%	1,722	0.04%
SILUMBE Richard	LM	1,296	0.03%	1,259	0.03%
TEMBO Sean	PEP	1,813	0.04%	1,786	0.04%
TONGA Enock	3RD LM	3,112	0.06%	3,081	0.07%
Valid Ballots Cast		4,832,763		4,568,725	
Rejected Ballot Papers		126,569	2.55%	122,440	2.61%
Total Ballots Cast		4,959,332		4,691,165	

The failure by the ECZ to load all polling stations results and to provide polling district and registered voter information undermines the transparency and accountability of the result tabulation process and public confidence in the accuracy of the results. In 2021, the large margin of victory resulted in the presidential results not being contested, but in a closer election, the missing polling station results on the ECZ results could have prompted claims of manipulation. CCMG informed the ECZ of this analysis in December 2021 and requested that the ECZ provide all results to the public, however to date CCMG has not received a response. CCMG again calls upon ECZ to provide results for all elections in a downloadable machine-readable file (i.e. Excel or CSV format) with all 12,152 polling stations that includes full location information (province, district, constituency, ward and polling district as well as respective codes) and with registered voters in addition to vote counts. This is the gold standard set out by the Open Election Data Initiative and is practiced by electoral commissions internationally, and will enhance transparency and accountability of the result tabulation process and public confidence in the accuracy of the official results. CCMG also calls upon the ECZ to immediately post on its website the presidential election results of the 545 polling stations shown as missing from the CCMG analysis

CONCLUSION

Based on its PVT findings, CCMG concludes that Election Day processes were conducted with high adherence to the established electoral procedures and given that the CCMG PVT estimates verify the ECZ's official results for the presidential election, CCMG believes that all Zambians should have confidence that the ECZ's official presidential results are accurate and reflected the ballots cast at polling stations. CCMG commends the ECZ for its meticulous tabulation and announcement of results, and the many millions of Zambians, particularly those first-time voters, for casting their ballots and participating in Zambia's democratic process. However, CCMG notes that while Zambia's institutions were successful in supporting an election that reflected the choices of its voters, these institutions were severely tested and shortcomings and weaknesses in Zambia's electoral system and governance structures that were noticed must be addressed. This will help to strengthen the quality of Zambia's democracy and to preserve Zambia's legacy of democratic competition and peaceful transfer of power.

During the 2021 electoral cycle, CCMG documented an unacceptable level of politically motivated violence, much of which was allowed to continue with impunity. Political polarisation did not help matters. These issues, along with documented cases of abuse of public office for political means, and uneven application of the Public Order Act and COVID-19 mitigation measures contributed to an uneven playing field. Similarly, while the ECZ carried out its mandate to conduct credible electoral processes, the implementation of the 2021 electoral cycle had a series of missed opportunities to enhance the transparency and accountability of elections in Zambia, and the lack of timely and constructive engagement by the ECZ undermined public confidence. CCMG and other stakeholders repeatedly made reasonable recommendations to the ECZ and other key stakeholders to improve both the operating environment and the implementation of the 2021 electoral cycle, none of these recommendations were largely acted upon. except the conversion of polling streams to polling stations,


Against this backdrop, there is need for concerted effort by all stakeholders to both build on the successes of the 2021 electoral cycle as well as to address the identified shortcomings in order to continue strengthening democracy in Zambia. This will, among other efforts, require comprehensive reforms of pertinent constitutional and legislative provisions, and the buttressing of governance institutions to better equip them to respond to challenges that undermine and erode public confidence in the electoral process.

APPENDICES

I. CCMG PVT Structure

CCMG's highest decision-making body is the Steering Committee, which comprises the heads of each of the four partner organisations. Father Emmanuel Chikoya, the General Secretary of CCZ, serves as the Chairman of the CCMG Steering Committee. The other members of the Steering Committee are: Father Alex Muyebe, Director, JCTR serves as the CCMG Steering Committee Spokesperson, Bishop Andrew Mwenda Director, EFZ; serves as a member of the CCMG Steering Committee and Father Francis Mukosa, Secretary General, ZCCB as Steering Committee member. The CCMG secretariat is hosted by Caritas Zambia.

CCMG has the following organisational layers: 1. Steering Committee 2. Secretariat 3. 181 Mobile Constituency Supervisors (who also serve as District Monitors for the LTO Project) 4. 1,500 PVT Monitors.



2. CCMG Preliminary Statement



CCMG Preliminary Statement on the 2021 General Elections

“CCMG issues preliminary statement on 2021 general elections, will release PVT estimates for presidential election as appropriate to ensure the official results reflect the ballots cast”

13 August 2021

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) as part of our comprehensive monitoring of the 2021 elections deployed over 1,600 monitors and mobile supervisors to every province, district and constituency on Election Day. Today, we provide the preliminary findings on the conduct of voting and counting based on their reports from across the country. Reflecting that elections are a process and not just election day, we are also sharing a summary of pre-election issues. We will provide a more detailed assessment and evaluation of the pre-election period in our final report. We have completed our PVT and will release our PVT estimates for the presidential election following our analysis of the observation data and as appropriate. These estimates will allow CCMG to determine whether announced results are consistent with, and a reflection of, the ballots Zambians cast. CCMG continues to monitor the electoral process and we will make our overall assessment of the 2021 general elections once the process is complete.

Summary of Pre-Elections Issues

Throughout the pre-election period, CCMG deployed 330 long-term observers (LTOs) to every constituency of the country to report on electoral preparations; the campaign and political space; implementation of COVID-19 mitigation protocols; politically-motivated violence and related acts; the use of government resources in campaigning; and partisan acts by traditional and religious leaders, among other issues. CCMG also deployed monitors to a statistical sample of over 1,000 registration centres during the voter registration process.

National Registration Card (NRC) Issuance: An NRC is required both to register and to vote and thus the issuance of NRCs is a critical part of the electoral process. The official mobile NRC exercise was conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) from August through November 2020. The MoHA exceeded its target for NRC issuance during the mobile exercise, with over 1.5 million Zambians able to obtain an NRC, many of whom were first-time voters. However, the process was affected by: 58 unannounced mobile issuance exercises; lack of transparency on schedule and procedures; denial of access for CCMG monitors to NRC issuance centres; and unexplained large differences by province in issuance rates against MoHA official targets, with for example, Luapula having a success rate against the MoHA target of 181% and Western having a success rate of 52%.

Voter Registration: The ECZ determined to conduct an entirely new voter registration exercise for the 2021 elections. While Zambia has used both new and updated voter registries in the past and there are strengths and weaknesses to both, there was insufficient stakeholder engagement prior to implementation to build broader consensus and confidence in the process. The ECZ conducted voter registration from 9 November to 12 December with an extension from 17-20 December, which CCMG monitors documented largely adhered to procedures and resulted in very few questionable registrations of ineligible persons. The registration process resulted in a record of over 7 million votes included on the

certified voters register. However, late announcement of the registration period, a shorter registration period than in the past, unreasonably long lines in some registration centres, significant disparities in registration centres staffing levels across provinces, lack of transparency about procedures, staffing and kit deployment and failure to provide CCMG monitors with detailed registration information were significant shortcomings in the registration process. The refusal to permit an independent audit of the register further undermined transparency and was a missed opportunity to enhance confidence in the final register.

Campaign Period: Politically-motivated violence has become disturbingly common, with CCMG monitors reporting over 70 incidents during the campaign period. Our monitor reports show that both PF and UPND members and supporters were the main perpetrators in politically violent acts in about a 2 to 1 ratio, respectively. While the police have largely allowed the violent acts to continue with impunity, they themselves have used excessive force on several occasions against UPND party members and supporters. CCMG monitors reported on 28 instances of the limiting of campaign space due to the Public Order Act or COVID-19 mitigation protocols, with almost all these limiting campaign space for UPND. On the eve of the election the President decided to deploy the military across the country, citing the need to control political violence. However, this measure could have had a positive or negative effect on citizens exercising their democratic right to vote.

ECZ Engagement and Information Sharing: The ECZ succeeded at organizing both registration and election day processes that largely adhered to procedures and had small numbers of ineligible participants. However, the ECZ did not regularly engage with civil society organisations (CSOs) on key electoral processes and inquiries for essential information about the electoral process either went unanswered or were responded to very late. In addition, transparency was reduced by the failure to share timely and comprehensive information about key electoral processes. Despite inquiries, the procedures and staffing and kit deployment plan for voter registration, voters registered at the end of each phase, procedures and deployment plan for the use of voter verification devices and Election Day procedures were never publicly shared. In addition, the very late announcement of accreditation procedures and requirements, some of which were new and burdensome, gave stakeholders little time to plan.

Media: While CCMG did not undertake media monitoring, we have reviewed the reports of MISA-Zambia on the issue. Those reports note that the media coverage of opposition parties, including UPND, was significantly less than that of PF. Particularly concerning was the inequitable coverage of political parties by the public broadcaster, the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), which is mandated to provide equitable coverage. In addition, the 2020 shutdown of Prime TV and the IBA finding of professional misconduct by Muvi TV raise serious questions about media freedom. CCMG met with both ZNBC and IBA to engage on these issues.

Political Use of the Legal System: During the runup to the elections, there were multiple arrests and charges filed against opposition party members or private citizens that either appeared to have a political motive and/or infringed upon their human rights. These cases set a dangerous precedent of using the legal system for political purposes.

Election Day Preliminary Findings

CCMG's preliminary findings are based on reports from a nationally representative sample of 1,500 polling stations located in every province, district and constituency of the country as of 12h00 on 13 August.

Accreditation: Election Day accreditation for citizen monitors was unnecessarily burdensome and lacked uniform procedures across all districts. This was contrary to best principles stated by the Election Commissions Forum of the SADC Region to which the ECZ is a member. Despite these challenges,

CCMG was able to accredit all 1,500 stationary monitors plus additional supervisors for Election Day. However, for 31 CCMG monitors, the ECZ did not provide them with an official accreditation card. On Election Day, several CCMG accredited monitors were initially not permitted into polling stations. While all but one of these issues were ultimately resolved, it delayed monitoring of the process in some polling stations.

Opening of Polling Stations: Polling stations opened on time with 96% open by 06h30 across the country. On average polling stations had six polling officials. PF and UPND had party agents at 99% of polling stations and at 80% of polling stations there was at least one party agent from other parties. At less than 1% of polling stations were any materials reported missing during setup and at over 99% of polling stations the presidential ballot box was shown to be empty before being closed and sealed.

Voting: At over 99% of polling stations the basic voting procedures were adhered to with: voters' fingers being checked for indelible ink; voters being required to show their NRC and Voter ID card; polling officials checking for voters names in the voters register; polling officials stamped the presidential ballot paper before issuing it to voters; and voters' fingers were marked with indelible ink. However, there were reports of polling stations running out of ink for the official stamp as well as indelible ink that may have delayed the voting process. At 3% of polling stations, voting was suspended at some point during the day. At 97% of polling stations, no one voted who appeared not to be eligible, while at 2% of polling stations, CCMG monitors reported that a few individuals (one to five) were allowed to vote, even though they did not have both an NRC and voter ID card or already had indelible ink on their fingers or their names were not on the voters register. At 6% of polling stations, the setup allowed polling officials and/or party agents to see how voters marked their ballots.

Voter Verification Devices (VVDs): Polling locations with multiple polling stations have long posed challenges for voters as it may not be clear to voters which is their assigned polling station. This issue was exacerbated for this election as 907 of the 12,152 polling stations had duplicate names⁶. VVDs were used at approximately 13% of polling stations with the devices most common in Lusaka and Western provinces. While VVDs could potentially have played a role directing voters to the correct polling station, their late introduction served to raise predominantly confusion and concerns about their use on Election Day.

Voter IDs and Ballot Papers: The ECZ Election Officer's Handbook calls for polling officials to write Voter ID numbers on the ballot paper counterfoil. Because both the ballot paper and the counterfoil have a unique serial number, the writing of Voter ID numbers on the counterfoil makes it possible, though it could be challenging, to determine how a voter marked his/her ballot thereby compromising the secrecy of the ballot.

Closing of Polling Stations: Polling stations were scheduled to close by 18h00. At 97% of polling stations voters in the queue at 18h00 were given an opportunity to vote. While 44% of polling stations were closed by 18h00 and a further 47% closed by 20h00, 7% of polling stations closed after 20h00. Polling stations closed particularly late in Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces where 15% and 14% respectively closed after 20h00.

⁶ For example, according to the ECZ's Registered Voters Per Polling Station 2021 there are four polling stations at the Children of Bethrehem School in Wusakile ward in Wusakile constituency. However, three of the polling stations are named Children of Bethrehem - 1 while one is named Children of Bethrehem - 2. What distinguishes the three polling stations with the name Children of Bethrehem - 1 is their polling district, but this information is not printed on Voter ID Cards.(see <https://www.elections.org.zm/download/3847/>)

Table 1: Polling Station Closing Times by Province			
Province	By 18h00	By 20h00	After 20h00
Central	47%	50%	3%
Copperbelt	28%	55%	14%
Eastern	49%	49%	3%
Luapula	61%	35%	3%
Lusaka	28%	53%	15%
Muchinga	45%	49%	5%
Northern	57%	40%	2%
North-Western	56%	35%	9%
Southern	41%	47%	8%
Western	53%	43%	4%
Total	44%	47%	7%

Source: CCMG 2021

Counting: PF party agents were present for the counting of ballot papers at 98% of polling stations while UPND party agents at 99% of polling stations. Ballot papers were counted at the polling station 98% of the time. At 10% of polling stations there was insufficient light during counting making counting the ballots more challenging. At 98% of polling stations the presidential ballot papers were shown to all party agents and monitors present so they could see how each ballot paper was marked. At 90% of polling stations the presidential ballot papers were sorted into individual piles by candidate. At 97% of polling stations, all of the presidential ballot papers were counted according to ECZ procedures. At less than 1% of polling stations did a PF or UPND party agent disagree with the presidential results.

Violence: There were multiple acts of violence on Election Day. It was widely reported that the PF chairperson for North-Western province was killed and the former Mayor of Lusaka from PF was stabbed. CCMG condemns all political violence in the strongest terms, and those responsible for these acts must be held to account. There were also a number of confrontations where voters at polling stations believed that there were persons carrying pre-marked ballot papers in their bags. Long queues also resulted in several instances of disruptions in the queues at polling stations. Overall, though, incidents of harassment or intimidation were reported at 2% of polling stations, while incidents of violence at 3% of polling stations during voting and counting.

Internet Access: There were numerous reports of internet access being limited on Election Day. The global internet monitor NetBlocks⁷ confirmed that social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and messaging apps Messenger and WhatsApp were restricted on multiple internet providers. Such internet shutdowns undermine transparency of the election process and curtail the right of voters to receive information about the elections.

⁷<https://netblocks.org/reports/whatsapp-and-social-media-restricted-in-zambia-on-election-day-18lpLY8a>

Inclusion: Approximately half of all polling officials were women and 39% of security officers at polling stations were women, while 43% of PF and 37% of UPND party agents were women. At 48% of polling stations voters had to climb stairs to reach the polling station limiting access to the physically impaired. Only 44% of polling stations had Braille Jackets to assist the visually impaired. At 96% of polling stations persons with disabilities, pregnant women, nursing mothers and the elderly were allowed to go to the front of the queue. At 6% of polling stations someone other than a polling official assisted multiple people to vote. At 6% of polling stations men were seen repeatedly voting on behalf of able-bodied women.

COVID-19: At 95% of polling stations there were hand washing or sanitizing facilities while at 99% of polling stations polling officials were wearing masks. However, social distancing was only maintained inside of 87% of polling stations. Furthermore, just 14% of polling stations were voters' temperatures taken upon entering the polling station. At 85% of polling stations no one was turned away due to COVID-19 mitigation measures, but at 12% of polling stations a few potential voters (one to five) were not permitted to vote.

PVT: CCMG informs all voters and contesting parties that we have our PVT estimates for the presidential election which provide independent non-partisan verification of the accuracy of official results. CCMG calls on ECZ to go above the letter of the law to be fully inclusive, transparent and accountable as they tabulate results; to only announce results that reflect the ballots cast at polling stations; and to release polling station level results to all election stakeholders in a single electronic file in accordance with Open Election Data Initiative standards⁸.

Conclusion


Today, CCMG has provided our summary findings on the pre-election period as well as our preliminary findings on the conduct of voting and counting on Election Day. However, the process is not yet complete and CCMG continues to closely monitor the process. We will make our final assessment of the overall election once the process is complete.

Further, we encourage all Zambians to remain calm during the tabulation of results, and we call on all political parties to avoid any actions that could heighten tensions as the official results are announced and to resolve any potential electoral disputes through peaceful means and legal processes. We also encourage the security forces to carry out their duty in an impartial manner without favour to anyone.

⁸ <https://openelectiondata.net/>

CCMG commends the voters who went to polls, often waiting in long lines, to exercise their right to vote. We note that many voters were young people likely voting for the first time. We also recognize the efforts of our fellow citizens who served as election officials at polling stations and made voting possible. Finally, we thank the more than 1,600 CCMG volunteers who diligently monitored voting and counting on behalf of all Zambia. All of your efforts together serve to strengthen our democracy.

God Bless Zambia



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3. CCMG Verification Statement



CCMG Verification Statement on the Accuracy of the Official 2021 Presidential Results

“CCMG PVT Verifies the ECZ Official Results for the Presidential Election Reflect the Ballots Cast at Polling Stations”

16 August 2021

Introduction

Today, the Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) is releasing its verification statement on the accuracy of the presidential results. CCMG conducted a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) for the presidential election as part of our comprehensive monitoring of the 2021 general elections. As we stated during preliminary statement, CCMG completed its PVT by 12 noon on Friday 13 August 2021 with over 99% of our monitors having sent in their observation reports. Had it proved necessary, CCMG would have released its PVT estimates if we had any indication there was manipulation of the official results. We commend the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) for fulfilling its constitutional duty with honour and are grateful to them for not having to do so. **CCMG now confirms that its PVT verifies that ECZ’s official presidential results reflect the ballots cast at polling stations.**

Methodology

CCMG’s PVT deployed carefully recruited, highly trained accredited independent non-partisan monitors to a nationally representative random sample of 1,500 polling stations with 866,689 registered voters of whom 463,625 are female (53.5%)⁹. The PVT sample was carefully constructed according to well-established statistical principles to ensure that it was nationally representative and included polling stations in every province, district and constituency of the country. This is done by stratifying by province, district and constituency to ensure the percentage of polling stations, registered voters and female registered voters in the sample closely matches the percentage for the entire country (see Annex 6). For example, Eastern province has 11.8% of all polling stations, 12.8% of all registered voters, and 13.1% of all female registered voters in the country, and so the CCMG’s PVT sample matches this distribution with 11.8% of polling stations, 12.8% of registered voters, and 13.3% female registered voters coming for Eastern province in the sample. This ensure that CCMG’s PVT sample is truly nationally representative and therefore, can determine the quality of the voting and counting processes and can estimate accurately estimate how Zambians cast their ballots in all 12,152 polling stations.

On election day, CCMG’s PVT monitors witnessed and reported on the entire voting and counting process, arriving at 5:30 in the morning and staying at their assigned polling station until counting was completed and results have been posted. Because CCMG’s PVT monitors are deployed to a nationally representative random sample, the PVT methodology provides the most accurate information on the conduct of voting and counting and it is the only methodology that can provide independent verification of the accuracy of official election results. CCMG’s PVT is not an exit poll. Our monitors do not ask any voter for whom he or she voted. CCMG’s PVT monitors also do not count the presidential ballots as that

⁹ 53.4% of registered voters are female (3,751,040 of 7,023,499)

is the responsibility of the polling officials. However, our monitors are present throughout the counting process and report on its conduct. CCMG's PVT estimates, therefore, are based on the official and publicly available official results from polling stations.

PVTs are used around the world and across Africa to independently determine if official election results reflect the ballots cast. The PVT methodology has been successfully employed by citizen observers for multiple elections in numerous African countries, including: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe. PVT's have routinely been conducted for presidential elections in Zambia with PVTs previously conducted in 1991, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016.

The PVT methodology is impartial and non-partisan and reflects the ballots cast regardless of the outcome of an election. Thus, PVTs in Zambia have verified results in past elections both when the ruling party candidate won the election as well as when an opposition party candidate prevailed. For example, the PVT verified the results of the 2008 presidential election when the late Michael Sata lost as well as confirmed his victory in 2011 (see Annex 5).

PVTs serve to independently verify official election results by comparing the official result with the PVT's estimated range for each candidate (as well as for rejected candidates and turnout). If the official result falls within the PVT estimated range, then the official result reflects the ballots cast at polling stations. However, if the official result falls outside of the PVT estimated range, then the official result has been manipulated and the PVT suggests the true result.

CCMG is an independent, non-partisan citizen monitoring network that conducted a comprehensive observation of the 2021 general elections, including a long-term observation of the pre-election period and the election day PVT. Our observation effort was undertaken to ensure a credible electoral process for all Zambians, and we are beholden to no candidate nor the ECZ.

CCMG PVT Findings

As Table 1 shows, for the two leading candidates as well as for all other candidates combined, the official results announced by the ECZ¹⁰ fall within the PVT estimated range and therefore, we can declare with confidence that the official results reflect the ballots cast at polling stations (see Annex 1 for CCMG PVT estimates for all presidential candidates).

The PVT estimated range for Hichilema's vote share is 57.7% to 60.5% and his ECZ official result is 59.4%, which falls within this range. Similarly, for President Lungu, the ECZ official result is 38.4%, which falls within the PVT estimated range for his vote share of 37.1% to 39.7%.

Presidential Candidate	ECZ	CCMG PVT		Verified
	Official	PVT Estimate	Margin of	
Hichilema, Hakainde (UPND)	59.4%	59.1%	+/-1.4%	✓
Lungu, Edgar (PF)	38.3%	38.4%	+/-1.3%	✓
All Other Presidential Candidates	2.3%	2.5%	+/-0.3%	✓

Source: CCMG 2021

Note: ECZ official presidential results for 155 of 156 constituencies (excluding Mandevu constituency) while CCMG PVT estimates for all 156 constituencies.

¹⁰ At the time of this statement, ECZ had announced results for 155 of 156 constituencies (excluding Mandevu constituency) while CCMG PVT estimates for all 156 constituencies

Because CCMG's PVT estimates show that the lowest possible result for Hichilema (57.7%) is greater than the highest possible result for President Lungu (39.8%), the only possible outcome of the election is for Hichilema to receive the most votes of any presidential candidate.

Further, according to CCMG's PVT estimates, the lowest possible result for Hichilema is 57.7%, which is greater than the 50%+1 vote share required to prevent a presidential runoff election.

CCMG's PVT estimate for turnout is 70.4% +/-0.7%, with a range of 69.7% to 71.1% and for rejected ballots the PVT estimate is 2.5% +/-0.1%, with a range 2.4% to 2.6%. With 155 of 156 constituencies announced, ECZ's turnout figure is 70.8%¹¹ with 2.3% rejected ballots.

CCMG's PVT monitors reported the election day process was inclusive and transparent, as both PF and UPND party agents participated throughout voting and counting across the entire country (see Annex 2 and 3). As previously reported, PF and UNDP had party agents at 98% and 99% of polling stations during the counting of ballot papers. The PF and UNDP party agents also agreed with the official vote count for the presidential election at 98% and 99% of polling stations, respectively. At 97% of polling stations, a PF party agent signed the official presidential results form (GEN 20), while at 99% a UPND party agent signed the official presidential results form (GEN 20). In addition, polling officials posted the official results for the presidential election at 95% of polling stations (see Annex 4).

Overall, while there were serious challenges during the pre-election period that raised questions about the fairness and credibility of the electoral process, the ECZ conducted a well-organized and credible election day process that largely adhered to official procedures,

and both PF and UPND party agents were involved through the voting and counting across all provinces. Given that the CCMG's PVT estimates verify the ECZ's official results for the presidential election, all Zambians should have confidence the ECZ's official presidential results are accurate and reflect the ballots they cast at polling stations. We commend the ECZ for meticulously tabulating the presidential results and announcing results in line with its mandate.

Conclusion

Now that the results for the 2021 presidential election have been announced and independently verified, CCMG calls on the winners, and their supporters, to be magnanimous in victory and to work with all Zambians for the good of the country. We have pressing development challenges made more difficult by the COVID-19 pandemic. We call on the winners to govern on behalf of all Zambians and on all Zambians to work together, drawing on our diverse talents, to build a better life for ourselves and our children.

To those who unsuccessfully contested elections, and their supporters, CCMG notes that our independent non-partisan observation on behalf of all Zambians clearly shows that while the process was not perfect, the official results for the presidential election reflect the ballots cast. We call upon all Zambians to remain calm and to resolve any electoral disputes that may arise peacefully through the appropriate legal procedures.

CCMG reminds all Zambians there will be elections again in five years when they will again have the opportunity to determine who governs on their behalf. Zambia has now had seven elections since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 with incumbents being re-election as well as opposition candidates winning elections. The official results show, once again, that our elections are not a forgone conclusion to those who seek political office and that ultimately it is the voters who will decide who governs on our behalf.

¹¹ Total registered voters excluding Mandevu constituency is 6,861,080 and therefore ECZ's turnout for 155 of 156 constituencies is equal to 4,858,193 divided by 6,861,080.

While CCMG is proud of Zambians and our institutions that have delivered an election that reflects the choice of the people, we must strive to improve our electoral and governance processes to address the many shortcomings that threaten the quality of our democracy, governance and future electoral processes. First, Zambians must examine why we continue to experience unacceptable levels of political violence and polarization and begin to work together on solutions. Second, while CCMG commends the ECZ for conducting an election that overall provided Zambians with an opportunity to determine their government, as noted in our preliminary statement CCMG urges the ECZ to engage with stakeholders in a more constructive and timely manner going forward and to increase its commitment to transparency by sharing key information, such as electoral process procedures and the voters register in an analysable format to allow for independent review. Third, the 2021 elections, like those before, were marred by candidates and their supporters from all political parties making specious arguments about the conduct of the elections and the ECZ. These superficially plausible but false accusations unnecessarily heighten political tensions and unduly undermine public confidence in our nascent electoral institutions as well as the long-term democratic development of the country.


Following the elections, CCMG will issue a comprehensive final report on the 2021 general elections. It will include detailed recommendations on how we can further strengthen our elections and democracy. CCMG is committed to working with the ECZ and all stakeholders to learn from these elections to improve future ones and hopes to capitalize on the strong momentum provided by Zambian citizens in this election to address areas of needed reform in many areas. As such, CCMG intends to join with our colleagues in civil society and other stakeholders to host a series of forums in the post-election period to build consensus for reforms that will make our democracy stronger, increase guarantees for personal freedoms and human rights and improve governance for all Zambians.

CCMG continues to monitor the electoral process, as it is not complete until all electoral related disputes are heard and resolved. We call upon the courts, in the interest of ensuring all grievances are heard, to consider all petitions, regardless of whether they have minor technical mistakes or slightly miss filing deadlines. We further call on the courts to be guided by the law in ruling on any petitions and to make their judgements in a timely manner.

Finally, CCMG again commends the voters who went to polls, often waiting in long lines, to exercise their right to vote, a commitment that resulted in a record of nearly 5 million votes cast.

We note that many voters were young people likely voting for the first time. We also recognize the efforts of our fellow citizens who served as election officials at polling stations and made voting possible. Finally, we thank the more than 1,600 CCMG volunteers who diligently monitored voting and counting on behalf of all Zambia. All of your efforts together served to strengthen our democracy.

God Bless Zambia



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About CCMG: The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) is a partnership of four faith-based organizations: Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ); Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ); Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflections (JCTR); and Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) through Caritas Zambia.

CCMG is an independent non-partisan organization that monitors elections on behalf of all Zambians. CCMG's mission is: to strengthen genuine democratic electoral processes and encourage citizen participation in democratic governance in Zambia through civic and voter education, non-partisan election monitoring, research and documentation, electoral reforms advocacy and capacity building of civil society organisations in democracy, elections and governance.